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conferences in a war period. All sessions were devoted to current war 
and/or post-war problems, and the interest was as great as in previous 
years. The Department of Accounting wishes to express its appreciation 
to those who participated in the Institute, because travel and "living con­
ditions were not of the best and everyone was inconvenienced to a certain 
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The technical papers were up to the standard of previous Institutes, 
and they indicated serious thought on the current problems facing the 
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papers. 
The attendance far exceeded expectations, and was about equally 
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INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
By WYMAN P. FISKE 
Professor of Accounting, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge $ 
President, The National Association of 
Cost Accountants 
It is my privilege to open this session, the first session of the sixth of 
a series of successful and distinguished Institutes on Accounting here at 
The Ohio State University. We of N. A. C. A. have cooperated in most 
of these Institutes, each of which has made a very real contribution to the 
accounting profession. We are very happy to join again in this year's 
program. 
During the last 25 to 40 years, accounting, and particularly industrial 
accounting, has steadily increased both its contribution to industry and its 
importance. During the last 10 years, the responsibilities of the profession 
to the public, as opposed to management and the owners of business, have 
taken on a new significance. W e have recognized a responsibility to all 
who have any interest, direct or indirect, in American business. Because of 
the general recognition of that responsibility, our profession has gained a 
new acceptance. 
It seems to me significant and worth pointing out that the conditions 
under which we do our jobs have changed substantially in the last 25 to 
40 years. Accounting got its start as a service to the owners of business. 
In those early days, the ownership of business and the management of 
business were synonymous. Industry was truly privately owned, and those 
who owned the business were in the vast majority of cases the active 
managing group. Now, within the period to which I refer, that condition 
has changed. So far as the important industry in this country is concerned, 
we have public ownership rather than private ownership. We have owner­
ship distributed through a wide group of stock-holding and bond-holding 
investors. At the same time, and as a necessary corollary, a sharp division 
and distinction has appeared between ownership on the one hand and 
management on the other. 
Under these conditions those of us who are concerned with accounting 
find ourselves in the position of serving at least two masters. W e serve 
first of all the owners of the business. In addition, we have come to 
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recognize an obligation to a separate management group. As far as 
industrial accounting is concerned, and most of the problems with which 
we are concerned here in this Institute are problems of industrial account­
ing, the greatest advances have come in the direction of developing a 
service to management as managers. As a result of the first World War, 
as a result of the development of social legislation, and now as a result of 
the second World War, we have had tremendous increases in taxation 
and broad extensions of governmental regulation. Both of these have 
necessarily been based upon accounting information, and have put account­
ants in the position where they must necessarily recognize the obligation 
to the taxing and regulating bodies within the government. Further, in the 
last 10 years there have been important developments in the industrial-
relations area. There have appeared strong unions and strong bargaining 
groups led by individuals who are intelligent, who know how to read 
financial statements as well as accountants do, and who are taking advan­
tage of their bargaining position to make a claim upon any profits which 
we report in our particular companies. 
Finally, there has been an increasing public interest in profits. We 
must recognize, whether we like it or not, that industry operates by 
•sufferance of the public. The public is showing an interest in the amount 
of profits both as consumers and as taxpayers who foot the bill for the 
almost incomprehensible war outlays. These changes have resulted in a 
tremendously broadened interest in accounting figures. W e find that the 
public's attitudes on profits are assuming tremendous importance. They 
cannot be neglected. The attitude of the public is at once tremendously 
discouraging and at the same time a challenge to us, as accountants. A 
recent statement summarizes this attitude pretty well: "70 per cent of the 
American people believe that extravagant profits are being made out of 
the national emergency and that profiteering is prevalent, A full third 
of the American people believe that increases in profits represent the major 
reason for increases in the cost of living as against only 18 per cent who 
attribute them to increases in taxes. These and similar recent findings of 
public surveys make it obvious that companies engaged in war work must 
expand and shop in their technics of telling their profit story." 
It appears, then, that the cost concepts and the profit concepts which 
we hold—these two concepts are irrevocably tied together—and the 
policies which we follow, based upon these concepts, are assuming a new 
importance under a new and very general interest in business profits. It 
seems to me we have an obligation as a profession, an obligation which we 
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have not met too well, to explain our attitudes more fully to the public. 
We have spent a lot of time talking among ourselves discussing these 
questions. The time has now come when we must tell the story more 
broadly and explain to the general public what costs mean and what profits 
are, and what is the general social significance of each. 
It would seem that one of the things which might well be done in 
these days, particularly in view of the attitude of so many people that 
profits are extravagant, is to direct the public to a greater and closer 
attention to costs as opposed to profits. Profits in any case are a small part 
of the total sales income. The major part is cost, and I am sure it would 
be worth-while to direct the attention of the people to costs. 
Sufficient emphasis and sufficient recognition have not been given to 
the fact that our national standard of living is due in no small part to the 
effort of our forebears in laboring and saving a capital fund. This immense 
capital fund has been applied through tools to improve the productivity of 
the American working man, and, through his increased productivity, to 
increase his standard of living. Without that capital—if we can conceive 
for a moment that all that capital were destroyed—we would find ourselves 
back in the days of handicraft, and our high standard of living would 
disappear. 
Costs to us, as accountants, are an accounting device to protect capital. 
Costs are a measure of the amount of the part of our total production which 
must be retained in order to replace the capital fund. Otherwise we could 
not continue to produce on the same high level and could not maintain 
our standard of living. The real significance of losses lies in the fact that 
a loss signifies a wastage of this capital trust fund which is so important to us. 
We hear from time to time statements that the government can 
continue indefinitely on an unbalanced budget, and that it has not the need 
of business to watch costs, because it does not have, to get its money back, 
as business does. Now that may be true if you look at a section of the 
government, but if you recognize the government as really being us, all of 
us, I think it is fairly evident that no country, no matter how rich it is, can 
operate indefinitely on anything less than a break-even basis. No country 
can operate continually at a loss for that means consuming more than is 
actually produced and depleting the capital fund. The inevitable result 
would be a decline in the national standard of living. Those people who 
•express no interest in devices to protect capital fail, in too many instances, to 
realize that they risk throwing away the basis for the very high standard 
of living which they set up as an objective. 
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We, as accountants, have an obligation to tell, and continually to 
remind, the public that costs and cost accounting are not merely of selfish 
interest to private industry. We happen to be employed in most cases by 
private industry, but we have, also, a professional obligation. W e recognize 
the other interests involved in the picture, and we know, and the public 
should be told, that costs and cost accounting play a tremendously important 
social part in protecting that capital trust fund which we have brought 
down from the past, the fund which has made and still makes possible 
our high standard of living, and upon the maintenance of which will depend 
whether we have a continued high standard of living in the future. W e 
must at the same time re-examine our profit policies, because the policies and 
the methods by which profits are determined have a basis in the past and 
have their beginnings in the days when accounting was for a boss who 
owned and ran a business in which there was little or no public interest. If 
we take this approach, I think we have some small chance of changing the 
attitude of the public already referred to. 
* * * * 
The program of this Institute is largely concerned with industrial 
accounting problems. Industrial accountants can make, and I am certain 
that they are making, a very large contribution to the war effort by assisting 
management in its problem of getting out the war goods necessary for 
military victory. Management has never been more dependent than it is 
today upon accounting service provided by the industrial accountants em­
ployed by industry. 
In many cases, management is in the difficult situation of manufactur­
ing products in which it has absolutely no background of experience. I was 
tremendously impressed at one time when I heard one of the large auto­
mobile manufacturers make the statement that, in effect, his large concern, 
which does nearly a billion dollars worth of business a year, was forced 
to liquidate its entire normal business in 18 months, and then within 
about the same period develop an entirely new business of an even greater 
volume. Under such conditions, management needs help. It needs infor­
mation which only accountants can provide. 
Our job has many phases—there are many aspects of it—but there is 
no phase of it, in my opinion, which is more important than the problem 
of control. There is considerable talk going about that standards, budgets, 
and many common control technics are no longer of importance. Even 
admitting that certain technical devices formerly used are no longer avail­
able it is still true that industry, instead of needing less control, needs today 
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more control than it has at any time in the past. Our first paper to be 
presented this afternoon is concerned with that problem. 
Our first speaker has been continuously engaged in accounting and 
administrative work of one type or another for more than 30 years. His 
first position was with the National Cash Register Company. Later, he 
joined the Dayton Metal Products Company, and then, still later, the 
Wright Aeronautical Company. For the past 20 years he has been 
employed by the Inland Manufacturing Division, of the General Motors 
Corporation. In this particular organization he is divisional controller at 
Dayton, Ohio. His duties include not only those accounting responsibilities 
which ordinarily go with the controller's function but, in addition, include 
supervision of all labor relations, personnel, and educational activities. 
Our speaker has long been active in the National Association of 
Cost Accountants. After having served in many capacities in the Dayton 
Chapter, and finally as president of that chapter, he was for three years 
a national director of the Association. His subject is "Control of Labor 
Costs in Wa r Production." It is my privilege and pleasure to introduce 
to you, Mr. Max M. Monroe. 
CONTROL OF LABOR COSTS IN WAR PRODUCTION 
By MAX M. MONROE 
Comptroller, Inland Manufacturing Division, 
General Motors Corporation^ Dayton 
The control of labor costs in manufacturing plants in this country had 
reached a high state of development before this war. This statement could 
be made, I think, to a lesser extent of the other elements of manufacturing 
cost, but labor was the first segment of the cost structure to receive the 
study of industrial managers, engineers, and accountants. We had wage 
incentive systems, various plans for measuring the output of workers, both 
productive and non-productive. The experience and skills of process engi­
neers and equipment and tool designers had been concentrated on the 
improvement of the efficiency of the machines, the layouts, and the methods 
to provide for greater labor output. Of course, we weren't perfect—there 
was still progress to be made along various lines to further increase the 
efficiency of our labor—but we were pretty good. 
Let us look for a moment at what industry generally had in those 
days with which to acquire and maintain this relatively high efficiency. In 
the first place, we all had organizations that had been built up gradually 
over a period of years. W e had incentives, the profit incentive, and the 
incentive provided by competition, as well as the individual incentive to 
progress. We had years of experience, for the most part, in the manufacture 
of the products we were building. 
Again speaking for industry at large, we had ample technical staffs— 
time-study men, and cost accountants with years of cost experience on the 
jobs that were being produced. W e had plenty of material, we could get 
machinery and tools as we needed them, our methods had been improved 
and refined from year to year, and we had a good labor market. 
Most of the men and women who worked in factories and offices were 
experienced. W e had fairly high standards of quality for the labor that we 
added to our forces for replacements and expansion, and we had good 
management control of the discipline and efficiency of our employes. It is 
true that we may not have had as good control of the wage rate situation 
as we would have liked in the last few years, but we were able, most of us 
at least, to offset these increased wages by improvement in methods and in 
the efficiency of our operations. 
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A couple of years ago many industries were faced with the fact that 
they were going to be greatly restricted in the manufacture of the products 
they had been making, or in many cases be required to discontinue these 
lines of product altogether. At the same time, they were faced with, the 
necessity of converting their plants and organizations to the manufacture of 
war products. The magnitude of the war program and the urgent necessity 
for haste presented tremendous problems to industry—problems which were 
tackled bravely in an all-out effort, and the results of these efforts have 
been remarkable. As a matter of fact, they are probably a great deal better 
than a lot of us thought they would be when we started. While we have 
done a good job in coming through with production ahead of schedule, as 
the saying goes, the problems arising from conversion have had an adverse 
effect on labor cost control as we knew it before. Let us look briefly at 
some of these problems with which we have to contend. 
In the first place, many of us went to work on the manufacture of 
products that were new, products that wefe strange to us, requiring 
processes with which we were not too familiar. It was necessary in many 
instances to tear out production lines, equipment, and machine tools that we 
had been using for years, and to make new layouts, provide new tools and 
equipment, and develop new processes to do the job. Most of the products 
had never been manufactured in large quantities, and there was little 
previous experience on which to base estimates of their cost under mass 
production conditions. In many instances the job tackled was much larger 
than the job that had been done by the same organization during peace­
time. Subcontracting was made use of to a much greater degree than in 
normal times. This added to the burden. Our organizations, to a greater 
or lesser extent, had to be rebuilt and expanded hastily. As a general thing 
our technical staffs could not be expanded sufficiently to do the same kind 
of thorough job that had been done before, due to the fact that the job 
was much larger, that it came all in a. lump, and had to be done in a hurry. 
The loss of many experienced and trained younger men to the armed 
forces also contributed to this problem. We had the job of setting up an 
organization and training that organization to train the workers we had left 
in the use of tools, machinery, and processes that were not familiar to them. 
We also had to recruit a large number of green people and train them. 
There were delays in obtaining facilities such as machine tools, cutting tools, 
etc. The use of various materials was restricted, and there were delays in 
getting materials, which required a lot of time and effort to overcome. 
As I said before, industry had a big job to do and it had to do it fast, 
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and to hell with expense, at least until peak production was reached. The 
efforts of our managerial and technical staffs were concentrated on pro­
duction, on getting the machine tools and equipment to do the job, getting it 
installed, getting the material in, getting the workers trained, getting pro­
duction started, making products that would pass inspection, and keeping 
up with the engineering changes that resulted from the necessity of improv­
ing the products to keep pace with the equipment of the enemy. Many of 
us had a lot of new supervision which had been upgraded from the ranks 
and which was inadequately trained for the job. Our technical staffs of 
engineers and accountants not only had to try to take care of a larger job 
resulting from this high-speed conversion proposition, but also to cope with 
the various limitation orders, priorities, and the reports required by the 
various government agencies. 
Another factor which tends to reduce the efficiency of labor in war 
production is the relative lack of incentives and incentive plans. Many 
plants had eliminated incentive plans before the war. While this tended to 
reduce efficiency and increase labor costs, the situation was more or less 
controllable because of the previous experience of the organizations in the 
manufacture of their respective products under previously established 
incentive plans. This is more difficult to do today because the products are 
new, the processes are to some extent unfamilar, and there is no previous 
experience on which to base reasonable standards. In many other plants 
where incentive plans were in operation on commercial products, incentives 
have not been installed on war work. The reasons for this are: 
1. The difficulty of setting standards with a limited technical organization. 
2. The frequency of changes in design and in processes. 
3. The opposition to incentive plans on the part of labor organizations. 
All this has tended to a lower tempo of production effort on war work, 
and this fact is becoming more generally recognized in government circles. 
Furthermore, the labor market is inadequate. W e have lost and are 
continuing to lose a great many men to the armed forces, and while we 
have been able, temporarily, to keep some of our skilled mechanics and 
so-called key technical and supervisory personnel, we have all lost, and are 
continuing to lose, a large number of men who were good workers and 
good employes. More recently, since farming has been declared an essential 
occupation, we are losing many of our unskilled and semi-skilled workers 
to the farm. Due to these losses and also due to the demands of our pro­
duction schedules, we have been faced with a serious labor shortage which 
has been declared critical in many areas. Consequently, it has been necessary 
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to employ a large number of women and men who had no factory 
experience. In order to man the jobs we have been forced to reduce our 
entrance standards for new employes. This has resulted in high labor 
turnover and abnormal absenteeism. 
The matter of disciplinary control has become more difficult. This is 
partly due to the large number of new employes who have had no factory 
experience and who are unfamiliar with our regulations. It has been 
necessary in many instances to train these new employes in advance of 
having all of the actual tools and materials with which to work. During 
these so-called "pre-production" periods there could be nothing that re­
sembled efficiency. As a result of the high rate of turnover and the difficulty 
of obtaining replacements of good quality, there has been a tendency, in 
many instances, toward reducing standards of discipline and efficiency, a 
tendency to put up with what you have because you don't know when you 
will get a replacement, and when you get that replacement you are not sure 
that it will be an improvement over what you have. 
It has also been advocated in certain quarters that the control of dis­
cipline and efficiency of employes is no longer the exclusive responsibility 
of the Management, but has become, to a certain extent, the joint respon­
sibility of Management and Labor. In many instances Labor has asked 
for, and in a few instances has obtained, an equal voice in the maintenance 
of discipline and in establishing production standards. In those instances, 
Management's responsibility has been passed on to others. 
Another result of our labor scarcity and high turnover, etc., is the 
tendency on the part of some employers to raise wages without regard to the 
inflationary effects. In spite of the efforts of the Wa r Labor Board, wage 
rates have increased considerably during the past year, and wage levels in 
certain areas and in certain industries are really alarming. 
Let us now consider the possible bad results which we can expect from 
this situation—which we are all in, more or less—when the time comes to 
convert from war production back to the products of peace, and when we 
will all have to compete for our share of the peacetime requirements of the 
industries of which we were a part before the war. The excellent position 
in the control of labor costs which were enjoyed before the war did not 
just happen. It was brought about by the constant efforts of industrial 
managers, engineers, cost accountants, over a great many years; it was 
brought about through the training of supervision in the methods of cost 
control, and through the forming of habits of watching costs, from con­
stant attention to the problem of obtaining greater labor efficiency. I don't 
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think any of us want to come out of this war with organizations that have 
become sloppy as a result of forming bad habits of spending without regard 
for costs* It takes a lot more time and effort to form good habits than it 
does bad ones, and it takes still longer to root out bad habits and replace them 
with good ones. This applies not only to the supervisor but to the employe 
who is being supervised. 
Neither do we want to go back to the competitive field of peacetime 
production to find that our labor rates are completely out of line with 
competition. If they are out of line it will not be easy, and it may be next 
to impossible, to bring them back into line. Furthermore, the recovery of 
that Management control over discipline and efficiency which we lose will 
be equally difficult. Now on this point I want to be clearly understood:
believe that collective bargaining is here to stay for a long time, and with 
collective bargaining properly administered I have no quarrel. My con­
tention is that collective bargaining should be limited to those fields for 
which it was originally set up and not be permitted to extend itself into the 
field of Management. 
Many of you may say that you do not believe that this situation is 
particularly serious, certainly that it has not reached the point to cause any 
great deal of alarm. With that I will agree, generally speaking, but the 
situation is there to a greater or lesser extent in most all war production in­
dustries. Certainly, after seeing industry do the stupendous conversion from 
peace to war production, overcoming the difficulties of that job, we can all 
agree that it can overcome any difficulties that stand in the way of getting 
back to peacetime production. However, we can make the job a lot easier 
if we start doing something now about correcting the situation. 
I would like to offer a few suggestions. First of all, I think we should 
examine the present status of our labor cost control. We should appraise 
the "attitudes of our organizations toward this problem, their interest in it, 
and the efforts they are making on it, and if we find that there has been a 
trend in the wrong direction, then we should endeavor to put on the brakes 
and get the machine headed back in the opposite direction. Until recently 
we have all had excellent excuses for our failure to give this problem the 
attention it received in peacetime production. We have had a big job to 
do and do fast. Our efforts have been concentrated on increasing pro­
duction and getting to that level of production which our government has 
asked. It was impossible to continue* to expand production and at the same 
time refine methods, processes, etc. But we now find ourselves, at least 
many of us, either at or nearing the peak of production. Schedules are 
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levelling off and in many items being cut back. W  e should therefore be 
able to find some time to do this refining job. If we find that our executives 
and foremen are not giving the matter the attention they once did, it will 
be necessary to rekindle their interest in the problem. If we find that many 
of the members of our organization as it now exists have not had sufficient 
training in the technique of cost control, it will be necessary for us to 
revive old or develop new programs for bringing this training to these men. 
W h a  t I have been trying to say may be summed up briefly, as follows: 
1. American industry has been faced with the tremendous task of convert­
ing from peacetime to war production in enormous volumes. 
2. It has done that job and done it well. 
3. During that process of conversion a certain amount of our control of 
labor costs has been lost as a result of a weakening of discipline and a 
lowering of efficiency. 
4. We want to go back to our peacetime jobs in just as strong a position as 
when we left them. 
5. Generally, we have arrived at peak production and should now be in a 
position to tackle the job of recovering whatever losses we may have 
sustained and of getting our house in order. 
CHAIRMAN FISKE: Thank you, Mr. Monroe, for a very excellent and 
interesting discussion. I am particularly impressed with your emphasis upon the 
attritional effect of continuing, for any considerable period of time, to accept 
even a reasonable excuse for increased costs. It doesn't take very long, under such 
conditions, for high costs, which may be understandable, and excusable on the 
ground that we need the production at the moment more than we need low costs, 
to become accepted as normal. Once you find yourself in that unhappy position, 
it is a very long and hard road to get back to the right perspective. 
The big problem to date in connection with the war has been, of course, 
to develop plants and their organizations to turn out the war material which is 
essential if we are to attain the complete military victory which we all want. 
That is the most important problem of the moment, and it has, very properly, 
attracted the major portion of the attention of American business men so far. 
Regardless of its immediate importance, however, we should keep in mind that 
industry has another job, another responsibility. Should we be unfortunate 
enough to win a military victory and then bring the boys back to economic 
confusion and an economic depression, under which there would be no jobs to 
enable them to maintain the high standard of living which is the heritage of the 
American citizen, it would be a very sad condition indeed. American industry 
has a responsibility in that direction—an extremely important responsibility. In 
the process of turning out the war goods, it must make sure that it doesn't so 
disorganize itself or so affect itself financially that it is unable to maintain solvency, 
unable to maintain the financial position which will make possible reconversion 
to peacetime activities. 
We know that reconversion is not going to be easy. It was a tough job to 
convert from peacetime to wartime work, and everything which we have done in 
1 4 ACCOUNTING INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS 
the one direction is going to have to be reversed when peace comes. There will 
not be, perhaps, the same degree of enthusiasm and the same feeling of urgency 
which assisted in the first part of the job. But if we forget about that need, it 
will be very easy so to run our businesses today that we will find ourselves sadly 
hampered in the problems ahead. Accountants have an important responsibility 
here. I like to think of accountants as being the guardians of the solvency of the 
concerns which employ them. It is their job to see that costs are covered. It is 
their job to see that the policies are followed which maintain the financial 
integrity and the financial strength of the company. 
It is not too soon, indeed it is highly important, to give consideration even 
now to the problems of planning to meet the return to peace. Already consider­
able attention is being given to it on the public platform, and, fortunately, there 
is evidence that businessmen are at work in their own companies. 
Our second paper today is concerned with some of the anticipated post-war 
accounting problems. It should help us to think about them and make plans 
either to meet or to avoid them. 
Our next speaker is a certified public accountant, who has the added advantage 
of a legal training and of being a member of the bar. He is a member of the 
National Association of Cost Accountants. In addition, he is a past President of 
the American Accounting Association, a member of the American Institute of 
Accountants since 1919. He has served the latter organization in the past as 
chairman of its Committee on Publications and as a member of its Committees 
on Accounting Procedure and Terminology. Currently, he is serving it as 
Director of Research. He has, also, academic experience. Since 1924 he has been 
a member of the faculty of Columbia University School of Business, where he 
is associate professor of accounting. He practices law as a partner in the law firm 
of Greene and Greene, and he is a receiver of the New York, Westchester and 
Boston Railway Company. 
This experience all adds up to a background which ought to be productive 
o£ some very interesting and worth-while material on "Anticipated Post-War 
Accounting Problems." It is a real pleasure to introduce to you, Mr. James 
L. Dohr. 
ANTICIPATED POST-WAR ACCOUNTING PROBLEMS 
By JAMES L. DOHR, LL.B., C.P.A. 
Professor of Accountings Columbia University; Partner, Greene £s? Greene 
(Counselors of Lazv)y New York; Director of Research^ 
American Institute- of Accountants 
In any discussion of post-war planning, one is likely to be met at the 
outset with the suggestion that planning should be deferred until the war 
is over, in order that our energies may be dedicated exclusively to the 
winning of the war. The unsoundness of this position is easily demon­
strated. While the terms "war" and "post-war" are convenient designa­
tions for many purposes, the periods indicated are, in the last analysis, only 
stages in a continuous course of development; planning need be no more 
limited now than at any other time. While no one can predict when the 
war will end, experience indicates that the cessation of hostilities will come 
suddenly and unexpectedly. If post-war planning is deferred until that 
time we will be wholly unprepared. Many post-war plans are in fact 
being made. Unfortunately, much of this planning is vague and ill con­
sidered; much of it involves the formulation of broad objectives without 
consideration of the means by which the objectives are to be attained; and 
much of it is directed towards the achievement of Utopian international 
relations, and is predicated on the naive and provincial assumption that all 
nations crave, or at least should be glad to receive, the blessings of 
American civilization. All too little consideration is given to the distressing 
problems of our own backyard. If we fail to participate in this planning 
our views will not be heard, and the views of those who are no more 
than vociferous are likely to control. Most important of all, the achieve­
ment of our hopes and aspirations in the post-war world should be the 
greatest possible incentive to the winning of the war. I believe, therefore, 
that immediate planning for the post-war period is vital, and that we, 
as accountants, will fail to meet our responsibilities to the community if 
we do not take part. This would be extremely unfortunate, for, if my 
analysis of the post-war problems is sound, the views of accountants should 
be of outstanding importance. 
In any planning for the post-war period some assumption must be 
made as to the kind of post-war world we can, or are likely to, have. 
Here, it is not difficult to be pessimistic. If one considers the wounds and 
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the scars which will be left by the war, the serious maladjustments in 
economic relations, the problem of reconversion to peacetime activities, 
the necessity of providing adequate employment, and the crushing burden 
of government debt, the prospect is not a happy one. In addition to every­
thing else, there remains from pre-war days a bit of unfinished business. 
Prior to the decade preceding the war, our basic philosophy was one of 
providing opportunity for men to help themselves, and whatever may 
have been the faults in the application of that philosophy, it made us the 
freest and wealthiest people in history. On the worst day of the last 
depression we were far better off than any other people in the world. 
As a result of that depression, however, we were urged to adopt a new 
philosophy, and we turned to the idea that a munificent government could 
bring "everything to everybody." In my judgment that philosophy had 
failed, up to the war's beginning, to demonstrate its efficacy; at the war's 
end a basic decision will have to be made as to whether we are to continue 
the genial trend towards hoboism in our economic life or whether we shall 
revert to the "sweat and save" philosophy which guided us in the past. 
In view of all these discouraging facts, devotees of Schopenhauer may 
perhaps be pardoned for expressing the view that life in the post-war 
world will have to be lived for a long time on a substantially lower 
standard of living. 
I prefer an optimistic viewpoint. I venture to suggest that if we 
conduct ourselves properly we can have the type of post-war world we 
want, and that we may well continue, in the post-war world, not only 
to maintain, but to raise our standard of living. Expressed in terms of 
simplified economics, our standard of living depends basically upon the 
quantity of goods which we produce and distribute. There is substantial 
reason to believe that we can, after the war, produce and distribute more 
goods and services than we have ever produced and distributed before. 
Manifestly, there will be, at that time, an unprecedented demand. The 
instinctive desires of the American people for various goods and services 
will be augmented by the pent-up demands engendered by war shortages. 
Improvements in manufacturing processes resulting from the war will 
make possible the production of new and better goods and services at lower 
costs. The rapid and unusual acceleration of obsolescence during the war, 
due to technical developments, will cause a large replacement demand. 
T  o produce for these demands we will have abundant natural 
resources, adequate plant and equipment, an intelligent population, and, 
what is so conspicuously lacking in those who criticize business most, the 
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administrative capacity or "know how" with which the various factors of 
production and distribution may be made to function efficiently. With 
this combination there should be no question as to our ability to produce 
and distribute the volume of goods and services which will make possible 
a higher standard of living. 
If it is possible so to produce and distribute, the critical questions 
relate to the manner in which the desired volume of production and dis­
tribution may be brought about. How can business be converted rapidly 
to a peacetime basis? By what means are the wheels of industry to be 
made to turn? How can business activity be established and continued 
at the necessary level? How can we, within a reasonable time, give peace­
time employment to our labor force of some fifty-million employables? 
In many respects this is the most important question of all, for I doubt 
whether we can stand another prolonged period of extensive unemployment. 
The only satisfactory answer I can find for these questions lies in 
the system of private business enterprise, and I believe that, given a fair 
chance, that system can attain the desired results. The basic requirements 
of such a chance are easily stated. T  o begin with, the private business 
enterprise, large or small, must be permitted, so far as reasonably possible, 
to establish and maintain adequate reserves to meet post-war requirements. 
I am fearful in this connection that the present combination of excess 
profits taxation and renegotiation refunds may make it impossible to estab­
lish the necessary reserves. As soon as the war is over, government con­
tracts must be speedily and reasonably settled so that business enterprises 
may be reimbursed for their war costs, including the costs of reconversion 
to peacetime business. If I understand the accounting procedure currently 
applied, no allowance is permitted for reconversion costs. Beyond this we 
should support a philosophy of incentives under which men will be rewarded 
in proportion to their work and the risks involved, so that existing business 
enterprises may enlarge the scope of their activities, and so that new business 
ventures may be started. Speaking generally, the private business enter­
prise should be permitted and encouraged to maintain a position of financial 
independence; its regulation should be limited to reasonable governmental 
supervision; it should be subjected to a sane tax program; it should be 
encouraged to enter new fields. In all of this, there is, of course, no 
thought that the business enterprise should not adequately realize and 
meet its social responsibilities. 
T  o achieve the desired objectives, administrators of business will 
manifestly need accounting information as it was never needed before; it 
1 8 ACCOUNTING INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS 
is our responsibility, as accountants, to see to it that the necessary informa­
tion is available. The requirement is not, however, one which will arise 
for the first time in the post-war period. The information is needed now, 
so that, for instance, adequate reserves may be established to meet the 
exigencies of the post-war situation; it will be needed in the period of 
transition from war to peace, so that, for instance, government contracts 
may be terminated by prompt and equitable settlements. In addition, it 
seems likely that there will have to be a recomputation of substantial por­
tions of the wartime accounting. In that process many difficult accounting 
problems will have to be solved. 
Our program, then, should be one of developing accounting so that 
it will be of maximum usefulness in preparation for the post-war world, 
and so that it will be of maximum assistance, after the war, in establish­
ing and maintaining the course of business at the desired level. It should 
be observed, of course, that, in so far as immediate problems are concerned, 
the program is already under way; what is needed is an extension of its 
ambit to include long-range planning. In considering the general lines, 
along which this development should occur, I shall therefore omit any 
direct consideration of wartime accounting or of the problems involved in 
conversion to peacetime activities; I shall confine myself to matters of 
post-war peacetime business. 
In this, connection it may be well to consider at the outset a somewhat 
broader use than has heretofore been made of accounting data. In times 
past, accounting has served the private business enterprise. It has also 
served various types of non-profit-making institutions, including govern­
mental agencies. It has played its part in the governmental regulation of 
business. With the increase in governmental control over the activities 
of the community and the evolution of various theories for the direction 
of social efforts, increasing attention has been paid to economic phenomena, 
the significance of which is determined from accounting information. As 
an illustration of what I mean, I refer to some of the monographs of the 
Temporary National Economic Committee, in which various accounting 
data are made a basis for conclusions in such matters as national income, 
corporate profits, invested capital, savings, etc.1 
Th e difficulty in this process is the unsatisfactory and fragmentary 
character of the available information; the conclusions drawn are in many 
cases not warranted because of meagre evidence. In Monograph 12, for 
1
 The Use of Accounting Data by Economists} Accounting) Auditing and Taxes 
American Institute of Accountants. 
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instance, the Treasury Department's statistics of income are cited as indi­
cating an increase in corporate "net worth," over a 29-year period, of 
$94 billion. The statistics also indicate corporate profits, during the same 
period, of $102 billion, dividends of $93 billion, and retained profits of 
$9 billion. After making allowances for known additional stock issues 
(net) of some $2? billion, there remains an unexplained increase in "net 
worth" of $66 billion. The author of that monograph concludes at one 
place that corporate profits must have been understated to this extent; 
at another place he cites the discrepancy as evidence of "write-ups." For 
myself, I can only say that I envy the statistician his temperament which 
permits him to treat so blithely a matter of $66 billion. 
If governmental policies are to be formulated as to these or similar 
matters, it is essential that there be an adequate summarization of the 
accounting data. The most comprehensive assembly of the data at the 
present time is that of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, in its Statistics of 
Income, but anyone who has worked with this data is familiar with its 
shortcomings. The task is one of tremendous proportions, and I suggest 
that it be studied by accounting organizations so that a comprehensive and 
effective plan of fact-gathering, summarization and publication may be 
developed. 
Further suggestions as to the development of accounting may be made 
along two general lines. There are matters as to which we have been 
concerned, to a certain extent at least, in times past, and as to which we 
have only to continue and enlarge our present efforts. In addition, there 
are matters which may be dealt with as the probable requirements of the 
post-war period. 
In the former category I would put, first" of all, the necessity of 
furthering the understanding of accounting. I think we must admit that 
accounting is not nearly as well understood generally as it should be, and 
that this condition is, in a measure at least, our own fault. I have dealt 
with this situation elsewhere2 and I am satisfied that the matter is largely 
one of terminology. Accounting is peculiar in that its ultimate effectiveness 
depends, in many situations, upon the translation of accounting information 
into action by those who are not accountants; accounting terminology is 
therefore of vital importance. An incredible amount of harm has been 
done by the use of the term "net worth" in the balance sheet. As a result 
of its implications the layman has been completely misled. One of the 
2
 "On the Understanding of Accounting," Journal of Accountancy, LXXI, 3 (March, 
1940­
2  0 ACCOUNTING INSTITUTT E PROCEEDINGS 
largest American corporations sought, in its 1942 report, to clarify the 
situation by adding to the term "net worth" a parenthetic designation of 
"book value." This merely compounds the confusion. I am glad to observe, 
however, that the usage has* largely disappeared from the accountants* 
reports. 
There are many additional matters of understanding which need 
attention. The widespread use of the term "earnings per share" has 
endowed income with a false appearance of certainty and finality, and has 
obscured the diiferences in the character of income and many other aspects 
of income determination. The conventional classification of corporate 
capital as between capital stock, capital surplus and surplus is hopelessly 
befuddling, and the Interstate Commerce Commission's substitution of the 
term "unearned surplus" for "capital surplus" merely thickens the fog. 
The description of inventory valuation as "cost" when we mean partial 
or production cost does not make for clarity. Many other illustrations 
could be given to indicate the necessity of further research, study, and 
education if a reasonable understanding is to be achieved. 
Somewhat along the same line, we should continue our efforts to 
dispel the "illusion of certainty" under which so many readers of financial 
statements labor. People must be made to understand that financial state­
ments are not matters of mathematical accuracy which may be designated 
simply as correct or otherwise; they must be made to comprehend that 
estimates and approximations are made as to many important items, and 
that all anyone can do is to say that the statement of these items is within 
the area of reasonableness; they must learn that many elements of finan­
cial position are not measurable. 
W e should continue our efforts to reduce what I call the "tolerances" 
in accounting; it is distinctly disconcerting to find that widely different 
results may be achieved on a given statement of facts, all of which are 
proper, or which may be justified under generally accepted accounting 
practices. In dealing with this problem a distinction must be made at the 
outset between matters of principle and matters of policy; it is apparent, 
I think, that the two are easily confused. The amortization of good will 
as a matter of policy is very different from its amortization as a matter 
of accounting principle. A further distinction must be made as between 
the statement of principles and the application of principles to given state­
ments of fact. As to the former, it is becoming increasingly clear that 
formulation is an extremely difficult matter; that there are no principles 
of universal application; that there is such a thing as conflict of principles. 
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Application of principles to facts is of even greater difficulty and is fre­
quently no more than an intelligent guess based on inadequate data. In 
addition, principles must be formulated and applied in the light of an 
ever-changing world. Finally, in the statement of accounting principles, 
I think it is important that the matter be left largely in the hands of the 
accounting profession, including public accountants, private accountants, 
and accounting teachers. Special rules may well be required for special 
purposes, but control over generally accepted accounting principles and 
practices belongs with the accounting profession. 
Something further must be done about the serious confusion in the 
balance sheet between "cost" and "value." In recent years we have 
moved substantially in the direction of the cost basis and we have definitely 
centered our interest in accounting as a process of cost amortization. There 
are many cases, however, of appreciation or decline in value as to which we 
have yet to determine the extent to which present value may be recognized. 
Value might be largely ignored if we lived in a stable and seasoned economy 
with a stable monetary unit. Unfortunately for accounting, we live in a 
growing economy in which we are plagued from time to time by sub­
stantial changes in price level. As a result of economic developments and 
variations in the purchasing power of the monetary unit, cost frequently 
loses much of its significance. T  o illustrate, the recent decision of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission in the Associated Gas and Electric 
Company case, relative to write-down where there is a permanent decline 
in earning power, raises an important issue. On the appreciation side the 
recent decision of the New York Courts in Randall v. Bailey makes it 
necessary for directors to consider present value in establishing dividend 
policy. W e may well start with a general presumption in favor of the 
cost basis, but, whenever the significance of cost is of lesser consequence, 
value must be considered. As a practical matter it may be that more exten­
sive use of the accounting reorganization will be necessary to bring accounts 
into accord with the more significant facts. 
There is much to be done in connection with the income statement. 
T  o begin with, I think we should give greater recognition to the variety 
of purposes for which income figures are used. Originally, the income state­
ment was prepared primarily for owner-management; today, the Govern­
ment, the investor, the labor leader, the reformer, the politician, and others 
are interested in profits. If profits are to stand up under these impacts 
they must obviously be of a stouter quality. This seems to indicate that a 
higher degree of conservatism is required in the statement of profits, and 
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that increasing recognition must be given to the fact that profits vary-
greatly in character and that there are business losses as well as business 
profits. A great deal has been said, much of it none too complimentary, 
about the "profit motive" in industry; perhaps it would be advisable to 
give consideration also to the "avoidance-of~loss motive."3 Businessmen 
have recently come to a realization of the necessity of interpretation and 
clarification of the income statement; efforts are being made to explain 
the income situation to stockholders; the recent pamphlet of the National 
Association of Manufacturers is an interesting attempt to prevent misinter­
pretation of the income statement.4 
An important suggestion has been made as to the structure of the 
income statement. The conventional sectionalizing and the showing of 
gross profits, operating profits, profits before taxes, etc., has led to the 
belief that there are various kinds of profits, whereas, in point of fact, 
the only item in the income statement which may be accurately designated 
as income or profits is the final item. of "net" profit or "net" income. 
In discussing this item, Mr. George O. May epitomizes the matter when 
he says "the netter the better."5 For years the corporate income tax has 
been levied under the general theory that the word "income" is the equiva­
lent of "gross income"; as a result the tax has, to a substantial extent, 
been a tax on capital, or at least a tax on income in which a higher rate 
masquerades for the stipulated percentage. We have witnessed many 
criticisms of alleged excessive war profits in which the critic was dealing 
with "gross profits" or "profits before taxes'' as indicating excessive profits 
under government contracts. 
The suggestion is that the income statement be prepared in simple 
form without sectionalizing. The revenues are set forth first; the various 
charges are then listed and shown as a single total; this total is deducted 
from the revenues to indicate income. Several large corporations have 
adopted the form, and it will be interesting to see whether it has a general 
appeal. 
I find, in my work at the Institute, that much of our difficulty 
with the income statement is due to two conflicting views as to its func­
tion. T  o some people it is a historical report of facts—an account of 
stewardship—-designed to show earnings. T  o others it is an analysis of 
the implications of those facts—a prospectus—designed to show earning 
sLyon, Risk, Profit and Loss (1943), page 73. 
* How to Prevent Misinterpretation of Your Profits, The National Association of 
Manufacturers, 1942. 
5
 Journal of Accountancy', LXXV, 1, page 7. 
 23 POST-WAR ACCOUNTING PROBLEMS
fower. Each concept has its place, but the attempt to combine both 
objectives in a single statement can only lead to unfortunate consequences. 
Turning to the additional accounting questions which are likely to 
arise in the post-war period, one can only speculate as to the nature of 
such problems. Much depends upon the length and course of the war 
and what we attempt to achieve thereafter. 
The primary question in the post-war period will be that of govern­
mental regulation. I have already indicated that I do not relish the 
thought of a life attuned to the directives of bureaucracy. Some regulation 
is, however, necessary, and since accounting is an important tool of regula­
tion we should lend sympathetic support in the solution of the many 
problems of regulatory accounting. With all our experience along this 
line, I think there is still much to be learned, and that we should be 
ready to assist in the development of sound methods of accounting control. 
It seems clear that the question of labor relations will be of paramount 
importance in the post-war world, for, manifestly, adequate progress is 
not possible with the present intolerable situation, a situation too much 
like that of Mr. Chamberlain at Munich. Everyone favors high wages, 
but labor should be taught to understand that it competes, not only with 
machines, but within its own ranks, and that the employer's ability to 
pay high wages depends upon his ability to sell the services which he 
acquires as a result of the employment contract. In addition, the division 
of revenues between what we call capital and labor is, in fact, a division 
between present labor and labor of the past. Accountants can help mate­
rially in bringing about better labor relations by providing the data neces­
sary for the development of sound labor policies, amiable labor relations, 
and satisfactory wage plans. 
It seems likely that a good deal of interest will center in the prob­
lems of distribution because of the fact that distribution cost is such a 
substantial element in the price to the ultimate consumer. We have done 
extremely well in the field of production; in the matter of distribution a 
great deal of improvement is possible. This problem seems to call for 
an extension of cost accounting techniques in the £eld of distribution 
accounting. 
Since margins are likely to be narrower, further consideration will 
have to be given to the problems of cost determination, and particularly 
to the question of volume or output in its relation to cost. T  o begin with, 
I doubt whether the conventional classification of cost as between produc­
tion, distribution, general administration, and finance is as useful as we have 
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felt it to be in times past. Cost means total or over-all cost, whereas the 
classification has led people to confuse various "partial" costs with aggre­
gate costs. It may well be, for instance, that a portion of administrative 
cost, so-called, should be included in production cost. In addition, there 
is too much variation in result depending upon the method of distributing 
indirect charges; widely different costs are computed on substantially 
the same facts solely because of the difference in method. As to the 
volume factor, in many situations the "differential" cost is much more 
important than the "unit cost" as ordinarily computed. Additional studies 
will have to be made as to the significance of differentials along with the 
related questions of idle production and idle distribution facilities. 
The question of consumer purchasing power is likely to be acute, at 
least for a time. As a result the financing of sales will, in many cases, 
be difficult; greater attention will have to be paid to the accounting for 
installment sales and for the financial costs involved in other methods of 
credit selling. 
Much remains to be done in the development of a sane tax program. 
As presently constituted, the Internal Revenue Code is a horrendous 
monstrosity, in which Congress has attempted to legislate, in the most 
obscure language, on every detail of income determination. The result 
is a symphony of obfuscation. Even the "relief" provisions are likely to 
drive the taxpayer mad long before he can enjoy their benefits. Obviously, 
accountants are in a position to make recommendations for sound policies 
in taxation, and we must not be discouraged by the failure of Congress 
in times past to follow our recommendations. 
In all of the above there will obviously be an increased need for 
organized accounting research. Facing the necessity of formulating ac­
counting principles, the practicing accountants are obviously handicapped 
by lack of time; accounting teachers do not always have the necessary 
factual data or the immediate knowledge of the problems of application. 
It is essential, therefore, that research agencies be established, with adequate 
facilities, so that research may progress intelligently and with the active 
cooperation of all classes of accountants. 
In the field of public accounting, I begin to sense a problem of some 
magnitude. In times past the public accountant has taken pride in his 
independence, and one of the healthy developments in recent years has 
been the increase of that independence. At the same time, the public 
accountant has endeavored to make himself more useful by an extension 
of his activities to include various services for his client. Th e suggestion 
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is now made that a close association with the affairs of his client, particularly 
in matters other than auditing, may result in a lack of independence. 
There may, of course, be cases in which this thought has merit, but I 
sincerely doubt the necessity of a general prescription of celibacy for the 
public accountant. After all, this idea would, in the last analysis, preclude 
acceptance by the public accountant of a fee, and when that point is 
reached the discussion is ended. Independence is vital, but some reliance 
must be placed on the integrity of the accountant. 
In the foregoing discussion you will doubtless have noted a con­
spicuous omission in that I have said nothing as to foreign trade. The 
omission is intentional, because I find the whole matter a very baffling 
one which I should like to dismiss, for present purposes, with a statement 
of the obvious, that we will undoubtedly find many new accounting 
problems in this field. 
As I see it, the post-war period offers a splendid opportunity for 
accountants—an opportunity to advance their own self-interest, an oppor­
tunity to assume a position of far greater influence in the economy, and 
above all an opportunity to serve the community. T  o these opportunities 
we may well dedicate ourselves with high hopes and expectations. If we 
plan now with courageous vision and support the development of account­
ing with diligence and devotion to our ideals of service, there is no question 
but that we can contribute materially to the post-war happiness and well­
being of the American people. 
DISCUSSION 
CHAIRMAN FISKE: We are indebted to Mr. Dohr for a very constructive 
and, what to me is particularly pleasing, an aggressive rather than a defeatist type 
of talk. There has been altogether too much of defeatism. 
We have a few minutes for questions and discussion. Mr. Dohr and Mr. 
Monroe will be glad, I am sure, to have your questions. 
QUESTION: Both Mr. Monroe and Mr. Dohr touched on, at least by 
inference, the question of wage incentives. Have you any idea as to how account­
ants might be able to instill in labor or government the idea of wage incentives 
for the purpose of getting high production or getting better production? 
CHAIRMAN FISKE: The question as I get it is concerned with methods of 
educating labor to the era of incentives. Inasmuch as Mr. Monroe's respon­
sibilities include not only accounting but industrial relations, he ought to be able 
to answer the question. 
MR. MONROE: It has been the experience of industry that the elimination 
of wage incentive plans has reduced production and increased costs. Due to the 
manpower shortage today it is becoming increasingly difficult to obtain efficiency 
or anything faintly resembling it by "disciplinary methods." As a consequence of 
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the resultant low efficiency the manpower' situation is intensified and the cost 
of war production is higher than it ought to be. The establishment of wage 
incentive plans properly administered will increase production and reduce costs. 
This will relieve the manpower situation and reduce the cost of war products to 
the government and to the people of the United States. It should not be too 
difficult to interest the government and public opinion and secure support in 
realizing these two obj ectives." In the final analysis both the government and 
labor are subject to public opinion. 
At the Inland Manufacturing Division of General Motors we have wage in­
centive plans and have always had them. At the present time there is considerable 
agitation on the part of the War Production Board and the Procurement Agencies 
of the Armed Forces for incentive plans. The reason advanced is that they 
will increase war production. Incentive plans, based on increased production 
above present rates of production, in most instances will result not only in 
increased production but also in increasing wages far beyond their present high 
levels. They will not reduce costs. I think it is important that production be 
increased to what it ought to be without raising the present high level of wages, 
and at the same time to reduce the cost of war material. This reduction in cost 
is vital to all of the people, who, in the final analysis, pay their share of these costs. 
CHAIRMAN FISKE: I am sure that there must be individuals in the audience 
who can contribute to some of these questions. Some of you, no doubt, have had 
experience with the problems that have been raised. Is there anybody here who 
would care to contribute his experience? It seems to me the problem of educating 
labor and the public is an extremely important problem, and one to which we 
must give our attention. Not nearly enough attention has as yet been given to it. 
QUESTION: I would like to know what the reaction of the War Labor Board 
is regarding incentive plans and increasing incentive plans. 
M R  . MONROE: The War Labor Board has taken the position that the 
introduction of incentive plans for the purpose of increasing wages, which would 
increase the cost of war production, will not be allowed. This same position has 
been adopted by the War Production Board. I believe the War Labor Board, the 
War Production Board, and the Procurement Branches of all the services would 
favor installation of sound incentive plans based on time studies, established by fair 
and accurate time and motion study of the operations being performed, on the 
basis of fairness and equity consistent with quality of production and the reason­
able capacity of normal operations. In those plants, with which I am familiar, 
that have maintained incentive plans established and operated on that basis, 
they are, in my opinion, just as efficient today as they ever were. However, it 
will be very difficult in those plants that have never been on an incentive basis, 
or were on an incentive basis at one time but are now on a straight hourly rate 
basis, to re-establish incentive plans comparable to those plants which have never 
lost them. The main point to be remembered is that the present high wage level 
in many instances was established under an incentive plan. Where incentive 
plans were dropped in favor of a straight hourly rate, the earned rate under the 
incentive plan became the straight hourly rate. The attitude of many of the 
Labor Unions toward the re-establishment of incentives is that they are willing to 
consider incentives on about the following basis: 
I. The present high rates of pay will be guaranteed. 
 27 DISCUSSION
2. The setting of standards shall be done by agreement between the Man­
agement and the Union. 
3. The Union will have its own time-study force to check the studies made 
by the Management, and approval of the Union will be required before 
the standards are set. 
4. Changes in standards can be made only by agreement between the Com­
pany and the Union, etc. 
These provisions would tend to establish standards at the present rate of 
production of employes, whether efficient or not. They would always tend to 
endless argument regarding the accuracy of the studies before they were made 
effective, and in the end, would result, as I have stated before, in greatly 
increasing the present high wage level. 
QUESTION: Mr. Dohr, do you think there is any possibility that post-war 
reconversion cost will be accepted as a current cost? 
CHAIRMAN FISKE: Mr. Dohr, do you want to take that? The-question 
refers to the Treasury acceptance of a provision for post-war adjustments in costs. 
M R  . DOHR: I don't quite see the point of the connection. In what 
connection do you want post-war planning costs accepted? 
QUESTION: On the same theory that the conversion costs from a peacetime 
program to a wartime program was allowed as cost, which presupposes that there 
will be expenses incurred by management to convert back. Isn't that a cost of the 
war effort which should be allowed as a cost to the producing company? 
M R  . DOHR: Yes. Well, I think I mentioned that point. In my opinion, 
the conversion from a wartime basis to a peacetime basis is a war cost. I take it 
your question is, Will the government in the settlement of war contracts make 
an allowance for these costs of reconversion? All I know is that the general policy 
up to the moment seems to be not to allow those reconversion costs in renegotiation 
proceedings. I certainly hope that by the time they get to the settlement of con­
tract terminations, and that sort of thing, they will allow the reconversion cost. 
The principal objection now, as I understand it, is that the amount is altogether 
too vague and cannot be reasonably estimated. This would seem to indicate that> 
if the time came when the amount could be established with a fair degree of 
accuracy, it would be allowed, but of course I can't give you any assurance as to 
what the present government will do! 
M R  . MONROE: Isn't it true that all war contracts have been written that the 
cost of reconversion to peacetime production shall be borne by the contractor? 
M R  . DOHR: That is my understanding. 
COMMENT FROM FLOOR: I would like to remind Mr. Dohr of the recent 
Truman Committee report, which I believe is the first encouraging sign in 
Washington of some possible recognition of post-war reconversion costs. The 
report was quite in the affirmative, since which time the Senate Finance Com­
mittee and the House Ways and Means Committee have had some conferences on 
the question. I think that I can promise, with reasonable assurance, that the 
Committee on Federal Taxation of the Institute is going to strongly champion 
the allowance of post-war reconversion costs for tax purposes, and that, if that 
be done as a matter of policy, the Price Adjustment Board likewise would have 
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to give it some recognition, but perhaps, to assure it later, it will also require 
some legislative action. 
CHAIRMAN FISKE: Thank you. Does anybody else care to comment on this 
question ? 
QUESTION: Mr. Dohr stated that business must be permitted to establish 
and maintain sufficient reserve for rehabilitation and conversion back to the 
peacetime pursuits. H e also stated that we had tremendously increased our 
productive capacity, which is true. There would be enough demand now for 
products, with no ability to buy. What is going to be the prospect along that 
line, with the high taxes and the spending people are doing today, high spending 
and little savings? 
M R  . DOHR: I take it your question comes down to this proposition— 
assuming we are in position to produce on a basis such as to raise our standard of 
living, where is the purchasing power to come from? 
QUESTION: That is right. 
M R  . DOHR: Of course, that is a vexatious question to say the least, and I 
can think of a great many other questions which will arise that I didn't touch 
upon. In my paper I pleaded guilty to the charge of over-simplification. It 
seems to me, however, that purchasing power is going to increase if we can 
provide adequate employment. I think you have a chain of events. If the 
business enterprise comes through the war with a reserve adequate to take care 
of its needs in the post-war period and to permit it to go forward with peacetime 
business, it can give adequate employment. As business gives employment you 
build up purchasing power. There is a" spiral which we have got to start 
going in the opposite direction from which it went in the depression. In the 
thirties' it was going downward; after the war we have got to start that spiral 
upward. 
I wouldn't be surprised if we needed a measure of governmental help in 
the transition period. I don't see how industry could, immediately after the 
war, give employment to the 50,000,000 people who are now employable. 
However, I think that, after a comparatively short time, private business enterprise, 
with the proper psychological attitude, will be willing to take risks, develop new 
fields, and hire men. That would give us the purchasing power. 
M R  . MONROE: Don't you think it would be possible, Mr. Dohr, to acquire 
capital by borrowing, after the war, with a fairly low rate of interest for expansion 
and conversion? 
M R  . DOHR: I think it will be possible to borrow if we have the credit 
position to do so. If we come out of the war with depleted assets, we are not 
going to be good credit risks. In that case, nobody but the government will lend 
us money. 
M R  . MONROE: The reason I asked that question is that I happened to be in 
Cleveland a while back on a Labor Board case, and one of the industry members 
of the Board was complaining about the tax situation. He is a business man. He 
said he would like to spend $300,000 on rebuilding his business after the 
war. H e couldn't do it if the government takes all the profits away from him 
either in taxes or by renegotiation. I asked him how he planned to get that 
money if there hadn't been any war. He said he hadn't figured that out, either. 
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CHAIRMAN FISKE: I think one of the really serious dangers is that those to 
whom people will lend won't need it, and those who' will need it will be unable 
to find anyone who will lend to them. Is there another question? 
QUESTION: I have a question that is rather academic, but I think it is 
pertinent inasmuch as it deals with the post-war situation. It has been pointed out 
that we have fallen into ways of laxity. Our labor costs are up and our general 
standards of control are down, which means that when we start to go back to our 
peacetime products our costs are going to be very much higher, I believe, than our 
old selling prices were. I wonder if you gentlemen on the platform would care 
to comment as to what the possibilities are of our establishing sales prices on the 
basis of our post-war costs rather than on the sales prices as they existed before the 
war. 
M R  . MONROE: Our post-war costs will depend greatly on the extent to 
tvhich our labor costs increase during the war as a result of the combination of 
increased wage rates and lower production efficiency. I believe it is generally 
predicted that they will be much higher than before the war. Whether or not 
the OPA—if we have an OPA after the war—and I am afraid we will—would 
permit the establishment of sales prices on the basis- of inflated post-war costs 
is a matter of conjecture. Many of you have had experience with the OPA and 
your guess is as good as mine, but I would venture that they would oppose it. 
QUESTION: T  O what extent do you feel wartime labor standards may be used 
in the post-war period? Incidentally, one of the things that is troubling me is 
the possibility of a great many strikes taking place after the war. They are on 
their good behavior now, but there is a possibility of even higher wages coming 
after the war. 
M R  . MONROE: I don't think I got the first part of that question. 
QUESTION: The question was, "Do you feel that present wartime labor 
standards can be used as a guide to help production planning in the post-war 
period?" 
M R  . MONROE: It is my opinion that the attitude of labor organizations after 
the war with regard to wages will be what it has always been, and that each year 
there will be demands for higher rates. If the War Labor Board or another agency 
with similar power is maintained after the war and is in a position to issue direc­
tives to employers to pay more money, it is my guess that each time the question 
comes up there will be more money in it for the workers in some form or another, 
just as I feel perfectly sure that the coal miners eventually will get some form of 
increase as a result of the present controversy. If such a government agency is not 
maintained after the war, and employers are in a position to reject demands for 
higher wages, there will, in all probability, be plenty of strikes. 
CHAIRMAN FISKE: If there are no further questions, I would like to thank 
both of the speakers for their contributions today. 
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In this Sixth Annual Institute of Accountants we are about to set two 
precedents. In the first place, this is the first time that any member of the 
accounting department of the University, who was on active duty at the 
University, has ever stood on his feet and said one word, and I do it no  w 
only because of the illness of Dean Weidler. Dean Weidler has presided 
at these sessions for six years. I think it is one of the things he enjoys, one 
of the things to which he looks forward, and I know he regrets very much 
that he is unable to be here this evening, and he asked me to express his 
regrets. He hopes that you will still have a good time and that he can join 
you next year. 
The second precedent we are about to set is the fact that this is the 
first time we have ever had a meeting off the campus. I don't know 
whether it is good or bad, but I remember that last year along about 
7:00 o'clock, when we were ready to start our meeting at the Faculty 
Club, the skies just opened up, the rain came down, and half of you got 
there and half of you didn't, so we thought that this year the logical plan 
would be to follow you down town and maybe you would get to the 
meeting. Looking around, I gather that most of you did get here. 
When we started to plan this program a few weeks ago we thought 
that the attendance might be 100 or 125. Naturally, we are very pleased 
to see the large number of people who have turned out to help us continue 
this series of Accounting Institutes which we started six years ago. 
In behalf of the Department of Accounting, I would like to express 
our appreciation to all of the people in Ohio and elsewhere, our friends 
who have supported our Institutes over a period of years, people who have 
been with us constantly, and to the speakers who have given up their time 
to be with us. 
Of course, one of the reasons why those of us in the Accounting 
Department have enjoyed participating in these Institutes is because we 
have had the wholehearted support of the University administration. You 
men know that in your own organizations, if you get the chief administra­
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tive officers behind you, the job is a lot easier. The Accounting Department 
of the University has been unusually fortunate in that we have always had 
our chief administrative officers behind us. 
There are a number of people at the speakers' table, and I often 
wonder why it is necessary to place so many at the speakers' table. I suppose 
someone has to sit up here to keep the principal speaker and the chairman 
company, so we have quite a gathering up here, as usual. Not all of them 
are going to make a speech, but I am going to at least introduce all of them 
and maybe let a couple of them say a word or two, if they would like. 
First of all, I would like to introduce the representative of our 
University administration, Vice-President Harvey Davis. Would you say 
something, Mr. Davis? 
D R  . HARVEY DAVIS: I don't know just how long ray remarks are 
to be, but I assure you that they will be very short. The Chairman has 
made a good speech of welcome already. About all I need to do from 
that standpoint is endorse it. 
Obviously, it has been known by all that three major jobs any uni­
versity has to do is to carry on teaching, carry on research, and carry on 
public service. This Institute is essentially in the realm of public service, 
and we enjoy greatly the groups, the many kinds of groups, which come to 
us, and we hope we are able to help them somewhat. Certainly we give 
you an opportunity to help each other. The accounting group is a partic­
ularly welcome group. You are a good bunch of folks to have around, and 
in these days an essential group. 
I remember a statistical book I studied once upon a time that started 
out by saying that whatever ties exist at all exist in some amount, and 
anything that exists in any amount can be measured, and so they went on 
from there. I think it is also true in this modern world that any enterprise 
we carry on costs some money. If it costs some money, that amount can 
be determined, but, once having determined that, we have a measure of 
relative importance of different enterprises. 
A world as complicated as this certainly requires the overtime efforts 
of you men who are able to measure, in so far as the financial end of it 
constitutes a measure, and it is a pretty big one in all enterprises, for us the 
different extents and, to a considerable degree, the importance of these 
measures, and we appreciate having you here, having you working together 
and giving us the benefit of your deliberations, and if we are able to 
help you any we are very happy about it. 
CHAIRMAN WILLCOX : Mr. Davis, I can truthfully say to you that 
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every year the members of the Accounting Department of the University 
have benefited materially by association with this group. 
We have some other members of our university family here that I 
would like to present. (The Chairman then introduced:) 
MR. CARL E. STEEB, Business Manager and Secretary of the Board of 
Trustees. 
MR. H. K. SCHELLENGER, Director of the Bureau of Public Relations. 
MAJOR JACOB B. TAYLOR, Chairman of the Department of Accounting 
(on military leave). 
You know we have always tried to gather together at these Institutes 
the presidents of the national accounting organizations, and we have been 
fortunate over the years in having most of them with us. They have 
participated in our programs, and have helped us in various ways. W e are 
always glad to have them. We are always glad to welcome them. 
(The Chairman then introduced the following:) 
WYMAN P. FISKE, Professor of Accounting, Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, Cambridge, Mass.; President of the National Association of 
Cost Accountants. 
GEORGE S. OLIVE, Certified Public Accountant, Indianapolis, Ind.; Pres­
ident of the American Institute of Accountants. 
A. L. PRICHETT, Professor of Accounting, University of Indiana, Blooming­
ton, Ind.; Vice-President of the American Accounting Association. 
J. A. HAWK, Certified Public Accountant, Dayton, Ohio; President of the 
Ohio Society of Certified Public Accountants. 
VICTOR H. STEMPF, Certified Public Accountant, New York; Past President 
of the National Association of Cost Accountants. 
You can't mention the National Association of Cost Accountants 
without thinking about its secretary. Every year, we have been honored 
by his presence. I suppose his title is business manager/ secretary, or some­
thing of that sort. I don't know. It doesn't make much difference to me 
what his title is. I have reference to Dr. Stuart C. McLeod, whom many 
of you know as "Doc." Would you like to say something, Mr. McLeod? 
D R  . S. C. M C L E O D  : AS the oldest living graduate of The Ohio State 
Annual Accounting Conference, I came here for the purpose of relaxing 
and not to make a speech, but my reputation has been built on never 
passing up an opportunity to talk if anyone will listen. 
I should like to say one thing to the Department of Accounting and 
to the administrative officers of The Ohio State University, whom I am 
happy to number among my friends through my association with them. 
It has always been a great pleasure to come here once a year, and I don't 
want you to think I come here through any sense of obligation or any 
36 ACCOUNTING INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS 
sense of duty. I come for only one reason. I come because I like to come. 
I like to associate with you fellows in these annual conferences, which I, 
personally, believe are making a very real and substantial contribution to 
the development of industrial accounting in this country. 
I should like to congratulate you and the administrative officers on 
your courage in holding this Conference. I remember last year when we 
were here you talked with me very frankly about the possibility of holding 
a Conference this year, because conditions are not as they have been in 
prior years. You decided to hold this Conference, and I am glad you 
did. I think it showed courage and vision, and I think it should have 
been held. We debated the same question in our National Board, as to 
whether or not we should hold an annual conference this year. W e came 
to the same decision you did, and we are going to hold one, not with 
any intention of opposing the restrictions which have been placed upon 
travel by the federal authorities, and also by the railroads and hotels and 
porters, but simply because we believe that the good that we can get from 
these conferences justifies the effort which may be invested in them and 
also the burden which may be placed upon our transportation facilities. 
W e are going to hold our convention in Boston, the last week in June 
of this year. We think we have the finest technical program we have ever 
presented in our history. W e hope all of you who possibly can will be there 
to join with us. Whether you can come to Boston or not, I congratulate 
you on your vision in coming here, and I hope that through these trying 
years you will continue to hold these conferences. 
CHAIRMAN WILLCOX : NOW we get down to the serious part of the 
program. I suppose I ought to tell you that our speaker is a graduate of 
the University of Illinois. He is a native of Illinois. After leaving the 
University of Illinois in 1910 he went to work for the Telephone Company 
in New York, and held several different assignments. In 1930 he was 
elected President of The Ohio Bell Telephone Company. 
Gentlemen, I have the very "great pleasure of presenting to you 
tonight, Mr. Randolph Eide, of The Ohio Bell Telephone Company of 
Cleveland, who is going to talk on the subject of "Looking Ahead." Mr. 
Eide. 
LOOKING AHEAD 
By RANDOLPH EIDE 
President, The Ohio Bell Telephone Company, 
Cleveland 
I claim that I am an accountant, and I learned accounting the hard 
way. I was born and raised in a country store in Illinois. My father, the 
proprietor of that store, kept a beautiful set of books. He knew how much 
money he lost on butter, on eggs, on hides, and on tallow. He knew how 
much his freight bills were and how much his express was, and once a year 
his four boys and he, right after the first of the year, had a favorite pastime, 
and that was inventory. Each of us sealed in an envelope his guess as to 
what the inventory would total. The one who guessed most accurately 
got $25, but father saved the $25 if he were closer. He would take a look 
at his books and do a little calculating and look out into space and write 
something down and seal it in the envelope. None of us boys ever 
collected a dime from him on that deal. 
Then again I qualify as an accountant, and you Ohio people will 
appreciate this: No man ever followed the famous Ohio Bell Telephone 
rate case without becoming qualified as an accountant, a thorough-going 
accountant. 
I have the greatest respect for the accounting profession. During that 
case we came down here frequently to confer with the Commission, the 
Attorney General, and others—my general counsel is here and he will 
probably take me to task tomorrow for revealing this—we used to come 
down here, and in ten minutes the Public Utilities Commission and the 
Attorney General would ask us enough questions to keep the accounting 
department busy for a week, but they wanted all the figures by 10 o'clock 
the next morning, and our accounting boys delivered them. 
Now I am here tonight somewhat under instructions. I am here 
because I am one of these weak business individuals who hasn't the ability 
to say "No." Your Chairman didn't start out to get me at all. He started 
lower down in the organization. I have one of the best buck-passing 
organizations you ever saw. They just passed the assignment on up until 
it got to me, and I accepted it. I am glad to be here, but I am somewhat 
concerned about the subject which has been assigned to me. 
I have been double-crossed. George Eckelberry wrote me and said 
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that he was pleased that I was coming. He also said that he would like to 
have me give a businessman's views on some of the problems that will be 
confronting us in the post-war period. I call your attention to the title that 
appears on the Program, which is, "Looking Ahead." That gives me a 
tremendous latitude, and I have about decided that I shall confine my 
remarks to prophecying what will take place 100 years from now! By 
then, no one,here can possibly be alive to check up on me. 
I am going to try to cover some of the problems and some of the 
items that are involved in the post-war period. I can only hit the high 
spots. I can't chart any courses. That is a job for much wiser men than I, 
and it is a job on which you can't generalize. Each individual business has 
to take whatever its problem is and try to fit it into what management 
thinks the future might be. 
Then there is a fund of literature. There is more being produced 
every day on the post-war period. Some of it I think is valuable, and it 
will all help us in our thinking. However, I think some of it, as I analyze 
it, is just wishful thinking. It is a bit dreamy, and I suspect it has been 
authorized by the starry-eyed boys down in the District of Columbia. 
There seems to be a little inclination on the part of some of the literature 
to want to change a lot of things—What we have had these 150 years in 
this country doesn't seem to be satisfactory, and we ought to change it. So 
my effort here tonight, compared with all of that fund of literature, is 
going to be, I am sure, quite ordinary. 
Of course, your greatest concern and my greatest concern today is 
that of winning the war. That is our Number One concern in production, 
Number One in manpower, and there can't be any let-up in any respect 
until peace is finally here. You hear today that there are indications that 
we are slowing up here, and we are going to slow up there. I don't think 
that is true. We may be putting the emphasis on another place because of 
the experience of battle, but we can't under any circumstances slow up 
until the job finally and totally is completed. 
Now I think one is required to look back before he can look ahead. 
Every great economic disturbance that is caused by war brings us great 
surges and peaks. That was true in 1815. That was true in 1865, and 
that was true in 1920. Those things, of course, simply give you and me a 
hint as to what we can expect in the future. 
Today, we are experiencing rises in prices. Living costs are going up. 
Wages are increasing, and each day sees some new circuit around the spiral. 
I don't know whether it is wages first, cost of living next, or what. It is 
a good deal like the old story of which came first, the chicken or the egg, 
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but the pattern today is taking on the same general characteristics of 
previous great disturbances. 
True, our government is inaugurating controls. It seems to be trying 
to do a good job. I, personally, am somewhat doubtful of its success. The 
controls may be slowing up the inflationary process; they may be preventing 
a run-away of that process, but I think I can see in the efforts some 
muddling, and even a suspicion of politics. So, the inflationary process that 
is going on about us today will, in my opinion, continue as long as the war 
lasts. It will continue after the war, and then you and I will be confronted 
with readjustment and the deflationary processes coming out of the situation, 
but at a level that will be probably permanently higher. 
Some of the controls that are being inaugurated seem to me quite 
flexible and elastic. Perhaps that is wise. Yielding to the various pressures 
is, perhaps, the thing to do, but each time that we yield we find the 
inflationary process pegged up another notch. That seems to be going 
on today in connection with the bituminous-coal situation, and in our 
constantly and continuously changing wage-stabilization policy. So there 
can be only one result, as I see it, at the end of the war, and that will be 
higher prices, higher wages, higher cost of living, more regulation of 
business, more restriction of your personal affairs and your business affairs, 
and of mine. 
These results are perhaps unavoidable. They perhaps are the price 
that democracy pays for war. They probably are not being and cannot 
be avoided in another form of government, and I, for one, think that, when 
peacetime comes, whatever is left to you and me is not impossible of solution. 
I have heard the present controls of the processes characterized, first 
as promises, then as excuses, and finally, as justifications. My business and 
your business, when we have finished, will have the painful job of extricat­
ing itself. 
Now let's take a look at the situation we were in during the period 
just before the war. Our economy received a terrific jolt in 1929, and we 
had experienced, up to the time of the war, several years of the most 
serious depression that our economy has ever encountered, but we had 
made great progress, tremendous progress from the bottom of 1932 and 
1933, when the outlook for all seemed staggering and the prospects black. 
We had come out of the heavy load of unemployment until largely, not 
entirely, our people were at work. Our business definitely was recovering 
before it had the innoculation that came to it as a result of the approach 
of the war effort. Confidence was being restored, and I think some of the 
hostility on the part of the government to business was becoming less severe. 
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There seemed to be a falling off in the desire to punish businessmen. In 
fact, there seemed, on the part of some, a slight appreciation that perhaps 
business and businessmen fitted properly into the scheme of things. Our 
businesses generally had adjusted themselves, had adapted themselves to 
the many controls and regulations that were born during the depression, 
and business had found that it could get along quite well. Business found 
that it could get along with the various regulations that were imposed 
upon it. 
In our own industry, the communications industry, we had been 
under regulation for a number of years. When regulation first came, most 
of us didn't like it, but regulations and controls, conducted by reasonable 
people, with reasonable administrative practices, were not intolerable, and, 
in fact, they proved some protection to our business. So long as the 
administrative bodies devised reasonable and sensible rules, we found that, 
under regulation, we could carry on quite successfully. 
I think that, in looking forward, it is well to appraise some of the 
results that this thing we call American business has accomplished. Whether 
it has accomplished them under its own initiative or been driven to do it by 
other sources makes little difference, but this thing that we call American 
business has succeeded in producing the best and the cheapest products 
anywhere in the world. 
And now I want to get in a little plug for the telephone business. 
It, also, has succeeded in producing the best and cheapest services existing 
any place, anywhere, in the world. That is true of other utilities. 
American business has produced these results with wages and salaries 
that are better than anywhere else in the world. It has gotten results under 
progressive improvement and continuous betterment of the general working 
conditions of the people who have produced these things. By and large, 
American business has enlightened employment conditions. It has adopted 
high standards of safety. It had adopted protection and, in many cases, 
social security for its employes long before it became a matter of legislation. 
True, there are some exceptions, but, by and large, I think that these 
attainments have been the result of the policy of American business. W e 
have produced under this system the highest standard of living of any place 
in the world. Our lower economic levels are enjoying many things that 
never have been made available in the same levels in other countries. 
There may be distortion between individuals. Some may have become very 
rich and others may have become very poor, but with the average middle 
class that this institution of business has made possible in this country, of 
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which class I like to include myself as a member, there is nothing to 
compare anywhere else in the world. 
There will always be differences between individuals. All of us were 
created equal, but you gentlemen connected with colleges know that there 
are differences in I.Q.s and in ambitions. You ladies and gentlemen are 
accountants, and you know what a.simple average is. If you make a simple 
average of the lot of a group of average men in this country and then super­
impose on it the lot of the average men of any other country, you will find 
that the best in most countries doesn't reach our average. 
I have an uncle living in Norway. I hope he is still alive today. He 
is an educator, attended Oxford University. I visited him in 1936. Our 
depression, you will recall, was several years old at that time, and he was 
thoroughly appalled at the terrific waste and the ways and means that we 
were adopting to pull ourselves out of the depression. You know Norway 
is a rugged country. It is a thrifty country, and you work there, and you 
work hard or you starve. He said to me a thing which I shall always 
remember, and it was this: "Randolph, the trouble with you people in 
America is that you don't know how to handle a depression. You ought 
to come over here. We have been handling one for 400 years, and we 
are a pretty enlightened group of people." 
Now, in looking forward, I think one must appraise what the Amer­
ican businessman has done in the present war effort. He has performed 
miracles, and I mean miracles! He has produced, after having been kicked 
around during the depression, beyond anything that was ever expected of 
him, or anything that he, himself, might have anticipated, and he has met 
the challenge and he has met it well. He has produced unfamiliar items, 
things with which he had no experience, at low costs. In fact, he has 
produced them at surprisingly low costs, and you men who are engaged 
in the renegotiation of some of the contracts are thoroughly familiar with 
the kind of a job that he has done. In many cases, this businessman has 
made reductions in prices voluntarily. 
He has created manufacturing processes simultaneously with the 
erection of his plant, and before the design of the thing that he was going 
to make had been completed. I saw evidences of that right out here at your 
Curtiss-Wright Plant. They were turning out stuff at one end of the plant 
and at the same time were breaking ground at the other end. 
Now what were the objectives, at least as we have been told, of the last 
war? We were told that we were fighting the war to make the world safe 
for democracy. W e were told also that we didn't finish the job. W e are 
told now that we are fighting to preserve the American system, preserve 
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our way of life. I firmly and thoroughly believe that, and, judged by what 
has happened elsewhere, if we don't come out successfully, which we will, it 
means the loss of our American system. 
Now I bring that out because, in this fight to preserve our American 
system, I think one of the foremost parts of that system is the preservation 
of this thing that we call American business. It is part and parcel of, and 
can't be separated from, America. 
Now the businessman today has many problems ahead. You know 
them as well as I do, but perhaps it might be worth-while to pause here 
a few minutes and enumerate some of them. He has ahead the problem 
of changing his whole relationship to our economy from one of war to 
one of peace. He has ahead the problem of recapturing lost markets, 
abandoned markets. He has ahead the problem of readjusting his productive 
machinery, his plants, and his factories, and his business to producing the 
goods of peace as compared with the goods of war. 
Looking at that from a telephone standpoint, we rather feel that 
readjustment is going to stimulate business immediately when peace comes. 
We have been carrying tremendous loads of long-distance service, but we 
rather look for the fact that the rush and the scramble to get on the market 
first with peacetime goods is going to sustain our telephone business. The 
same thing that affects the telephone business affects general business. 
True, there are going to be readjustments in the change-over, but I don't 
believe that there is going to be any complete stoppage. The businessman 
has the job of absorbing into civilian life our men and women who are 
in the armed forces. W e can't and won't let them come back and walk 
the streets. We are obligated in all institutions to find a place for them, and 
I am sure that that is what our businessmen propose to do. I am sure that 
if we handle our affairs properly there will be places, good places, for these 
men and women when they return from the armed forces. 
Only yesterday, and I say this with the greatest respect—it came up 
rather incidentally—in our own company we made a canvass of the number 
of physically handicapped people that we have working for us now. 
The number of men and women was rather startling to me. One of the 
reasons why we were looking into that was that we wanted to learn now 
how to give jobs to the physically handicapped, because, whether we want 
it or not, I am terribly fearful that many of our boys will return physically 
handicapped, and business must find a respectable place for them. 
Then we will have the job of handling the return to the home and to 
the normal pursuits of life, the many women that we have taken into in­
dustry. Some of them will remain permanently attached to business. Bus­
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iness will learn also that many of those people can perform tasks better, 
and perhaps cheaper, than men, and that will give you and me, as 
businessmen, another problem. We will have also the problem, as we had 
in the last war, of handling results of the great migration from our small 
towns and our farms to our cities. 
The businessman will have the job of adjustment to normal hours of 
work. Plants will have to be changed from working around the clock, 24 
hours a day, to the normal hours of work, to a normal day's work and a 
normal week's work, and that involves the problem of less take-home pay. 
There probably will have to be adjustment in some cases of the pay scales 
themselves. 
You hear every now and then an indication that, perhaps, when peace 
comes is the time to destroy the labor unions. I, for one, think we shall 
require more than ever before enlightened labor unions that can sit down 
with management and work out the readjustments of these problems of 
hours, working conditions and pay when peace finally comes. 
There will be the necessity for relaxing and eliminating, if you please, 
many of the regulations and controls that have been placed on business and 
our personal affairs. Many of those regulations and controls will remain 
probably with us forever. We certainly do not require wartime controls in 
peacetime, but the politicians and the job holders will want to retain and 
saddle onto business many of those controls. 
We will be confronted with the large job of disposing of inventories 
of war goods, inventories of goods in process, and inventories of raw 
material. Recently, I visited one of our large ordnance depots in a neigh­
boring state, and, ladies and gentlemen, literally I saw miles of telephone 
and radio apparatus and equipment piled 15 to 18 feet high in the ware­
houses, and that is the way it should be. We must continue making all of 
these goods of war right up to the very peace, and then, of course, business 
and government will be confronted with the disposition of these huge 
inventories. If supplies are thrown into the market, of course, they will be 
in competition with the things that you and I will want to make, and there 
again is a problem that is going to require the deepest thought and greatest 
cooperation. 
Business will have the task of financing its new production. It is 
going to require tremendous amounts of capital to change business over 
from an economy of war to an economy of peace, and, of course, we will 
have to participate in paying off the deficit of government. 
Then, too, we will have many of the social and political problems. 
I don't propose to go into them at all, and I don't propose to do anything 
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more here this evening than enumerate some of these things, with the 
hope that perhaps my coming down here may have stimulated some think­
ing on these very difficult problems. 
When our affairs are being readjusted we probably will develop many 
hatreds, political and otherwise. The larger problems will have to be left 
to our statesmen and our politicians. 
When this show is over we shall find much of our equipment worn 
out. We  . are going to find, and are finding today, of course, terrific 
shortages of peacetime capital and consumer goods. W e are not making 
any refrigerators, automobiles, trucks, household appliances, and so on. We 
are wearing out our railroads and pounding to pieces the rolling stock. We 
are wearing out our highways and also consuming the things that run on 
our highways. We are not adding to our communications system. We are 
living, so far as the telephone communications system is concerned, on past 
prudence and good long-term engineering. Already in the communications 
system we are developing shortages. Ordinarily, it wasn't a well-engineered 
telephone job unless we provided equipment for from two to five years 
ahead. That was the economical way of doing business. Today, we can't 
obtain the raw materials to do many things. 
That same thing applies to our railroads and our other utilities, and 
right up and down the whole line of industry, so that there is going to be, 
when we wind up this war, a perfectly tremendous backlog of consumer 
goods and capital goods that will have to be made. 
W e have a. public that has more money than it ever had before in its 
history. Our people, whether they have wanted to or not, have been saving, 
and they have been saving money because they couldn't spend it. Those 
savings will be available. There is plenty of cash ready to go into the 
market just as soon as you and I and the other producers produce the 
goods, or to go into capital investments to assist us in producing the goods. 
. I think that, when this war is over, we are going to be confronted 
with the necessity of returning to some old-fashioned economics. W e will 
return to the law of supply and demand. We will return to the situation 
where that business is most successful that delivers a product or service of 
highest quality at the lowest price. That type of economics has been 
repealed during this war period. It has-been speed of production regardless 
of price. 
W e in the telephone business have had a policy, for years, which we 
consider our golden text, and that is to furnish the best possible telephone 
service at the least possible cost consistent with financial safety, and with 
due regard to the well-being of the men and women who produce that 
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service. We have been unable to do that during this period. We haven't 
repealed that best possible service at lowest cost. W e are still trying to do it, 
and we are perhaps furnishing the best possible service under the circum­
stances that exist. Our automobile people have furnished you and me in 
the past the best possible automobile at the least possible cost, as have our 
tire people, our vacuum cleaner people, our refrigerator people, and so on 
down the line. Business has been conducted on that policy. It is the only 
way that a business can carry on successfully. When this war is over, your 
business and my business and all business, I am certain, must return to the 
old theory of quality and price. 
I think we must develop and improve relationship between manage­
ment and labor. We must have a relationship, if we can, that is less of 
conflict and more of cooperation. 
Then we will be confronted also with making the best peacetime use 
of things that research and development have brought into being as a result 
of the war effort. There are some perfectly marvelous things being done 
in relation to the war effort that will have a peacetime application, and 
business will be required to solve, when peace comes, the problem of making 
the best use of and marketing the things that were created through develop­
ment and research as a result of war. Such fields as plastic and chemistry 
have great possibilities, and great strides have been made in the airplane: 
The automobile and radio perhaps were the two outstanding things 
that helped us out of the difficulties of the last war. Certainly they had 
their development during the war. It seems to me that that development 
will become rather insignificant as compared with what is in store in 
plastics, chemistry, physics, and in the transportation industry as represented 
by the airplane. 
Then, too, we will have to participate in the job of world rehabilita­
tion. Wa r is a destructive element. Such countries as China, India, and 
Russia can still perhaps be regarded as backward, but they are having an 
awakening and they are going to be in our markets with perfectly 
tremendous demands for the goods that you and I can make available 
for them. ,. 
Now what about post-war planning itself? I can tell you only some 
of the things that we, in our humble way, are trying to do in our business. 
Several months ago I appointed a committee of top executives, not to spend 
their spare time in post-war planning but to spend, on a scheduled basis, a 
considerable time in post-war planning. There are many jobs that we 
know today must be done right after the war. There are many of our 
margins that have been exhausted that must be restored. Without going 
46 ACCOUNTING INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS 
into detail, after only a few months that committee made a report to me on 
the first of April for our little company here in Ohio. It found $52 million 
worth of work that should be done in The Ohio Bell Telephone Company 
just as soon as the material and finances are available. 
Now $52 million is just $52 million, but that represents two years of 
the biggest capital expenditures that The Ohio Bell Telephone Company 
ever had in its history, two years of work. 
W e are trying to see what the picture will be if business is slow, even 
if we recede from our recent volume, which, so far as we are concerned, 
would be helpful in some respects. In trying to set up and picture ahead 
what the situation will be, we are looking forward only two years. We 
will drop the year 1943 if peace doesn't come this year, and in the fall begin 
taking on 1945, and we will look over the picture continuously in that way 
and keep reviewing it. 
Similarly, a larger committee is working on the problems for the Bell 
System, and to date it has come to the conclusion that to re-establish the 
communications system of this country on the same level that it was before 
the war would require $1.5 billion of capital expenditures. It is speculating 
also into new things. For example, there isn't a cable today across any of 
our oceans. Communication is all done by radio. While it is good, it has a 
considerable amount of unreliability in it. Our men know today how 
to lay a cable across the Atlantic Ocean and make it talk, and then, of 
course, it would be free from all of the electrical disturbances and the ele­
ments. Our scientists are engaging in experimenting as to where television 
is likely to take us. 
Today, the Bell System Laboratories have 6,000 scientists and 
assistants, nearly 5,999 of whom are putting in full time on Army and 
Navy problems, but many of the problems that are being worked on are in 
the field of communication, and these post-war planners, so to speak, are 
studying the adoption of the results of the studies of the scientists. 
Now business, I think, has been making a very fine record. It was 
accused of being somewhat soft before the war. I think the demonstration 
of production indicates that we are a tough nation and that our businessmen 
know how to produce if given half a chance. We are going to have 
returned to us several million boys who have had a training under these 
wartime circumstances that they never could have gotten otherwise. I 
have three sons myself, and already I can see that my boys are receiving 
training that is far better than they were having in the universities which 
they were attending, and better than they were getting under their parental 
roof. My less-than-nineteen year old, who is a paratrooper, wrote me a 
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letter the other day, and he said, "Dad, when I get home, command me 
to work in the garden and I will say cYes, sir,' and do it." 
There is a great potential of capacity, of capability, that will be 
available for us businessmen to use when and as these boys come back. 
We can't conduct a business, no one can, without profits. There must 
be a return on investment and a return to the ideas of profit. The business­
man must be encouraged, and he must have a reward for his achievement. 
There is some indication, as all of us know, that if a man makes over 
X dollars these days, he should have it taken away from him. That isn't 
much of an incentive. We are all perfectly willing to pay taxes. I would 
just like to cite you one example, with which I am sure all of you will agree, 
of the type of man, if we could find that man, which we would be glad to 
reward by giving him a million dollars a year for the rest of his life. If we 
could find a man today who could solve the submarine menace, it might 
be a good investment to give him a million dollars a year for the rest of 
his life. 
There must be a reward for achievement and a reward for the right 
kind of achievement. There just isn't any limit as to what that reward shall 
be. Business cannot succeed without profit, because from profitable business 
has grown our schools, our colleges, our churches, our great medical 
philanthropies, support of our local and state governments, and, if you 
please, your job and mine. Business without profit is a disaster to the 
stockholder, it is a disaster to the management, and it is a disaster to the 
worker. 
Now I have just rambled along. I haven't been thorough, but I have 
been that way on purpose. I have tried simply to suggest for your thinking 
many miscellaneous items. 
In closing, I want to leave with you this thought: If we will encourage 
American business and the American businessman in his peace efforts as 
we have encouraged him in his war efforts, there isn't any question in my 
mind but that we shall have a most encouraging and happy future ahead 
of us. 
CHAIRMAN WILLCOX: Mr. Eide, in behalf of the members of the Account­
ing Department of the University and the members in attendance at the Sixth 
Annual Institute, I wish to express our appreciation for your very capable remarks. 
I think you have given us something that we can think about real seriously. I 
suspect that the members of the Accounting Department will go into a huddle 
next week to discuss what we are going to teach after the war. Some of you 
fellows will go home and go into a huddle and wonder what you are going 
to do about your various and sundry problems, because certainly Mr. Eide has 
suggested many things to cause us to think in the days to come. 
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INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
By JULIAN A. HAWK, C.P.A., 
Arnold, Hawk and Cuthhertson, Dayton; 
President, The Ohio Society of Certified Public Accountants 
Once again it is the privilege of the Ohio Society of Certified Public 
Accountants to participate in this annual Institute of Ohio accountants 
sponsored by The Ohio State University. On behalf of the Ohio Society, 
I want to express our appreciation for the opportunity which these annual 
meetings afford. During all the years of its existence, this Accounting 
Institute has maintained the highest standards, not only for the timeliness 
of the subjects which have been covered but also in the quality of the 
speakers who have appeared on the programs. The Ohio Society's mem­
bership looks forward to these meetings as one of the high spots on its 
annual calendar of events, not only for the educational benefits which are 
provided but also for the splendid opportunity afforded us to meet and 
renew acquaintances with those who are interested in the profession of 
accountancy. 
I like to think of the profession of accountancy as young but vigorous. 
I like to believe that it has not only high standards of practice and pro­
cedure, but also that it has ambitions to fulfill a much more important 
place in our national economy than has as yet been accomplished. Meetings 
such as the Ohio State Accounting Institute do much to gi^c us vision of 
what lies ahead. 
Our program this morning is based on the general subject of account­
ing for war contracts and the process of renegotiation or termination. 
These subjects are of vital interest to accountants, both public and private, 
and many of us are having problems to meet at the present time in these 
fields. Bankers and other credit grantors are also intensely interested in 
the balance-sheet presentation of these items. 
The first of the topics listed on the program this morning is "War 
Contract Renegotiation Problems." I know that many of you are here 
this morning especially to hear the discussion of this interesting subject 
by such an able speaker as Carman G. Blough. Mr. Blough is located in 
Washington, D. C  , and is Chief of the Contract Review Branch of the 
Procurement Policy Division, of the War Production Board, and serves 
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as the Wa r Production Board representative on the Price Adjustment 
Boards of the War and Navy Departments and the Maritime Commission. 
Prior to accepting this position, he practiced public accounting in Chicago 
and New York, as a partner in the firm of Arthur Anderson and Company. 
Mr. Blough is a certified public accountant and is registered in various 
states. He is a member of the American Institute of Accountants, and 
the American Accounting Association. He has written many articles 
appearing in various accounting and business journals, and has been in 
great demand as a speaker. 
Mr. Blough is a graduate of Manchester College, in the University 
of Wisconsin, and has taught accounting and finance at the University of 
Wisconsin and the University of North Dakota. In the last-named school, 
he was chairman of the department of accounting. His experience has 
been varied, since he has been in public practice as well as serving in the 
various governmental agencies. In Wisconsin he served with the State 
Tax Commission, where he was concerned with the income tax and, 
later, with the evaluation of public utilities. He has also served as con­
sultant for the Illinois Commerce Commission. When the Securities and 
Exchange Commission was formed, Mr. Blough served as the first Chief 
Accountant, and of course is responsible for a lot of the pioneering work 
in connection with the accounting regulations promulgated by that body. 
Mr. Blough will speak to us this morning on "Wa r Contract 
Renegotiation Problems." Mr. Blough. 
WAR CONTRACT RENEGOTIATION PROBLEMS 
By CARMAN G. BLOUGH, C.P.A., 
Chiefy Contract Review Branchy Procurement Policy Division, 
War Production Board, Washington, D. C. 
The subject of renegotiation is currently quite important to war 
contractors and to their accountants, but I am somewhat at a loss to 
know how to start and what to cover in talking to a group of this kind, 
because I don't know how many in the audience have already gone 
through renegotiation, or are in the throes of it, or have actively partici­
pated in the procedure, how many are just getting ready to do so, and 
how many know little if anything at all about it. In order to try to be 
of some assistance to all, I shall try to cover the entire field briefly. 
Most of you know that the so-called Renegotiation Act was passed 
and became law on April 28, 1942. The purpose and need for renegotia­
tion grew out of a number of things that took place prior to that time. 
As you all know, when we were preparing for the war, and then after 
we got into the war, it was necessary for the government to let a great 
many contracts for a great many things that nobody had ever made before, 
and for a great many things that had been previously made, but not by 
the persons to whom contracts were let, and for a great many things that 
had been made by the contractors to whom the contracts were let but 
not in such quantities as they were then being required. 
The result was that it was impossible for anybody to determine with 
even reasonable accuracy what many of the articles would cost, in the 
volumes that were being required for the government. Through no fault 
of any one, contractor or government contracting officer, prices were 
fixed at amounts which resulted in profits out of all proportion to what 
was intended by either the contractor or the contracting officer. Just one 
illustration to indicate how that worked. 
A certain company was approached with a request to manufacture a 
given piece of ordnance equipment. The contractor said, "Well, yes, I 
will be very glad to do what I can." He had had a great deal of experi­
ence in building equipment of the size and quantity that was required in 
this instance, but never of this type. He said, "How much should I expect 
to be able to do this for?" 
S3 
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The contracting officer of the government said, "Well, I really don't 
know. We know that they have been made on a sort of hand-made basis 
in the arsenal at a cost of approximately $10,000 a unit, but we have no 
idea how much they should cost in this volume." 
"Well," the contractor said, "if in quantity we can't beat the arsenal's 
prices by at least 20 per cent, we ought to go out of business, so I will 
take the order at $8,000 per unit." 
He took the order at $8,000, set up a line for mass production, which 
was possible in view of the quantities that were required, designed machines 
to do the work of 15 or 20 men, and ended up with a cost which made 
it passible for him to lower his price to somewhere in the neighborhood of 
$3,500 a unit. He didn't know that he was going to make such large 
profits, and neither did the government contracting officer. Nobody did. 
But there were many such types of contracts entered into, with the result 
that many companies made highly excessive profits. 
Many contractors volunteered reductions in prices, and a number 
suggested that they would refund to the government amounts which they 
had already received. Congress, recognizing that there must not be the 
scandalous or highly excessive profits on war contracts during this war 
that there were during the last war, gave consideration to what should be 
done to eliminate excessive profits. The discussions centered around a 
percentage of cost or a percentage of selling price, sometimes before income 
taxes and sometimes after income taxes. As I remember, the discussions 
ranged all the way from about 2 per cent of sales before taxes to 5 per 
cent of sales after taxes. Nobody knows better than you, as accountants, 
that applying any such arbitrary percentage, if high enough to take exces­
sive profits from all companies, brings extremely severe hardship on other 
companies, and, if placed low enough not to bring hardship on any com­
pany, would leave highly excessive profits with many. 
Under Secretary of War Patterson, Under Secretary of the Navy 
Forrestal, Mr. Donald Nelson, chairman of the War Production Board, 
and others appeared before Congress and objected to any arbitrary per­
centage limitations. In their discussions before the congressional com­
mittees these men told what they had been doing in the way of conducting 
voluntary renegotiation proceedings with contractors. The congressional 
committee liked what they reported and decided that if it was good for 
those contractors who would do it voluntarily, it wasn't a bad idea to 
apply to everyone, so it drafted legislation which provided that the Secre­
tary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Chairman of the Mari­
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time Commission should determine whether excessive profits had been 
realized or were likely to be realized on contracts let by their departments, 
and authorized them to renegotiate their contracts, directing them thereby 
to recover excessive profits already realized and to prevent the earning of 
excessive profits in the future. 
Under the law, each of the three departments set up a Price Adjust­
ment Board, to which were assigned the responsibilities for the administra­
tion of this renegotiation work. The responsibility and authority of the 
Secretary of Wa r were delegated to Under Secretary of War Patterson, 
and he, in turn, delegated the responsibility of developing the policies and 
administering the procedures to the Price Adjustment Board of the War 
Department. The Secretary of the Navy delegated his responsibilities to 
Under Secretary Forrestal, and he, in turn, delegated to the Price Adjust­
ment Board of the Navy Department. Admiral Land, Chairman of the 
Maritime Commission, also created a Price Adjustment Board and gave 
it similar responsibilities. 
There were a number of features in the law as it was first passed 
which were particularly objectionable to the contractors. The contracts 
might be held open for settlement until three years after the close of the 
war. There was a question as to whether loss contracts could be used to 
offset excessive-profit contracts. There was doubt as to whether the income 
taxes that had been paid on profits subsequently found to be excessive could 
be used as an offset against them. There was a question as to whether the 
departments could give a binding agreement which would for all time 
close this question of excessive profits. All of those questions were dis­
cussed and cleared up in an amendment which became law in October, 
1942, as a part of the Internal Revenue Act of 1942. 
In the same amendment, the Secretary of the Treasury was also 
given the renegotiation authority and responsibility. He in turn delegated 
to Clifton Mack, the Director of the Procurement Division of the Treas­
ury, and he in turn has set up a Price Adjustment Board in the Treasury 
to handle the work. 
The Maritime Commission's former responsibility for chartering, 
supplying, operating and repairing ships, etc., was transferred by executive 
order of the President to the War Shipping Administration. In line with 
that transfer of responsibility for such contracts, the President transferred 
to the War Shipping Administration the responsibility for their renegotia­
tion, and Admiral Land, as War Shipping Administrator, established a 
Price Adjustment Board in the War Shipping Administration. 
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Because of the interest of the War Production Board in renegotiation 
from the standpoint of the effect that it might have on war production, 
Chairman Donald' Nelson entered into an agreement with the various 
renegotiating departments under which he would nominate a person to 
be appointed by them to their respective Price Adjustment Boards. He 
chose to nominate the same person to each of the Price Adjustment Boards, 
so as to assist in coordinating their work, to help keep their policies and 
procedures the same, to bring the attention of the various Boards to any 
differences that might arise, and in general to know what is going on in 
renegotiation and to participate in the decisions of all departments. At 
present, I am that person. 
The process of renegotiation is one which many people have talked 
of as though it were something very mysterious. Probably that is due to 
the nature of the task. In fixing a definition of excessive profits, Congress 
was very helpful! It defined excessive profits as 'those profits which shall 
be found to be excessive3! I don't know that there is any better general 
definition. I have been trying to develop one I like better, but have not 
been successful. Neither have any of the other members of the Price 
Adjustment Boards, who are equally anxious to find a good over-all 
definition. We have all concluded that it comes down to a matter of 
judgment with respect to the individual circumstances in the individual 
case, that it is a matter of evaluating the job and arriving at a judgment 
as to what is a fair compensation for it. 
Under the powers of renegotiation, the government can go to a 
contractor who has already received compensation for his goods or services, 
decide that he has received too much and negotiate to take it back from 
him. This power seems to give contractors considerably more concern 
than they have with respect to the government's power to fix prices in 
advance by negotiation or mandatory order. We know that when the 
contracts are entered into from time to time there may be inequities arid 
injustices done between companies. One company may get a better price 
than another, or a poorer price. The contractor may misjudge; the con­
tracting officer may misjudge; the result of original procurement mistakes 
may be grossly inequitable; yet nobody thinks that it is un-American to 
enter into a negotiated contract. May it not then be questioned whether 
renegotiation as a part of procurement is so un-American in its nature? 
The power of the government to make an arbitrary finding, dictate 
the terms, and require compliance is not a new element. It existed in the 
power of mandatory order at the time of the original procurement, though 
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it was seldom used. We must not forget that in wartime, during the 
last war and during this war, the procurement departments have had 
this unusual power, yet very few have worried about it or considered it 
un-American. 
With this power of mandatory order, the contracting officer of the 
government, who is dissatisfied with a price which is being asked by a 
contractor, may get his department to issue an order requiring the con­
tractor to take the job and do it at the price specified by the government. 
If the contractor is not satisfied, he can sue in the Court of Claims for 
anything more to which he thinks he is entitled. That power is not very 
different from that which the department has if it is impossible for a 
renegotiator and a contractor to reach an agreement as to whether an 
excessive profit has been or is likely to be realized, and the amount thereof. 
The process of renegotiation is much the same in each of the depart­
ments, though there are differences in the form of organization. For 
example, the Army will have to renegotiate approximately 80 per cent of 
the cases. Naturally, with such a large job, it had to organize its work 
differently. It has, therefore, set up approximately 45 different subdivisions 
in the various services. For example, in the Ordnance Department there 
is a Price Adjustment Section in Washington under which there are 10 
or 12 divisional offices in which Price Adjustment Sections have been 
established. The divisional sections enter into the preliminary agreements 
with contractors, send up their recommendations to the Price Adjustment 
Section of the Ordnance Department in Washington, which reviews it, 
'and, if it approves, sends it to the Price Adjustment Board of the War 
Department for final approval, after which it is ready for the signature 
of the Under Secretary. 
The Navy Department, with less than a fourth of the Wa r Depart-
ment's job, has set up one Price Adjustment Board, with two subsidiaries, 
one in San Francisco and one in Chicago. In New York, the Board has 
set up a branch of the main Washington Board, the policies, however, 
being formulated in the Washington group. 
The Maritime Commission, the Treasury, and the War Shipping 
Administration, having much smaller jobs, have only one Board each. 
Although the administrative set-ups are different, the actual prin­
ciples, policies, and procedures followed in renegotiation by all the Boards 
are the same. Meetings are held jointly by all of the renegotiating staffs 
of all the Boards at regular intervals, every two or three months, at which 
times cases are discussed in considerable detail and efforts are made to 
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bring the valuation sights of those who are involved closer together so 
that the judgments of one group, under a particular set of circumstances, 
will be more nearly like the judgment that would have been arrived at 
by some other group. There are bound to be differences. A Board in 
California, even though following the same principles, policies, and pro­
cedures, may differ from a Board in Boston unless they get together quite 
often. Two people in adjoining offices may differ in their judgment. 
That, however, is no more true and probably no less true than in the 
case of our district courts scattered around the country. Qualified persons 
differ in judgment, and, therefore, there will be differences in settlement. 
That is inherent in any judgment determination, and renegotiation is 
fundamentally a matter of judgment. 
A renegotiation is a discussion between the representatives of the 
contractor and the representatives of the government. All of the facts 
that are involved in the company's operations are considered insofar as 
they can be brought out. Usually, before the renegotiation a certain 
amount of basic statistical information is called for. The company's annual 
financial statements from 1936 through the last fiscal year, a statement 
with respect to the company's renegotiable business and non-renegotiable 
business for 1941 and 1942, or for the fiscal periods beginning in those 
years, a statement as to the methods that were followed in segregating 
renegotiable from non-renegotiable business, an explanation as to the 
methods followed in the distribution of costs, data with respect to the 
company's operations, what it produces, etc., are some of the things 
generally required. 
In addition to this type of information obtained from the contractor, 
the price adjustment representatives get from the contracting officers, and 
other government sources, information with respect to what the contractor 
has done, his performance, pricing policies, what his competitors are doing, 
what other companies in the same field producing similar material are 
being paid, his comparative efficiency, his cooperativeness, the extent to 
which he has furnished "know-how" ideas and suggestions to the govern­
ment or has relied on others for them, and so forth. Having accumulated 
all of the data which they can reasonably get which throws a light on 
the operations of the contractor and the kind of a job he has done, the 
government's renegotiators ask the contractor to come in for a confer­
ence. They may have one, two, three or possibly more, usually one or 
two, conferences with the contractor, in which he is urged to present 
all of the things he sees from his angle which justify the profit which 
WAR CONTRACT RENEGOTIATION PROBLEMS 5  9 
he has made or the profit which he thinks he should be allowed to retain. 
After the contractor has presented his case as he sees it, an attempt is 
made to reach an agreement as to what is the amount of excessive profit, 
if any, which that particular contractor has realized on his renegotiable 
business. I will discuss shortly what constitutes renegotiable business. 
As I said a bit ago, the determination of what constitutes excessive 
profits is a problem of judgment. There are many, many factors that must 
be considered. It is impossible to develop any practical mathematical for­
mula by which the various factors could be applied to different cases. 
There are so many shadings to the factors. The same is true of almost 
any valuation problem. For example, if you were attempting to determine 
what you would be willing to pay for a certain piece of property, you 
would first inquire into many factors—transportation to your customers 
and from your suppliers, the nature of other businesses in the locality, the 
cost of reproducing the buildings and equipment, labor costs in the area, 
whether labor is organized, whether it is friendly, the amount of the 
taxes, etc. After such a survey of the factors, you would say,  " I would 
be willing to give $150,000 for this piece of property." Would you be 
able to set down all the factors and the percentages or values that you 
had applied to each in evaluating that property to arrive at the amount 
that you would be willing to pay? If you could, you would be very much 
the exception among business men, at least among those in my own. 
experience. 
That is the problem of those who participate in the renegotiation 
procedure. One must have a conception of the various elements of risk 
that a contractor has taken, the extent to which he has had to depart 
from his customary lines of manufacture, change his plant and machinery, 
and train his organization, the extent to which his plant is likely to be 
useful after the war is over, how far it is likely to be necessary to reconvert 
in order to get into a peacetime business, how extensively his employes 
will have to be retrained or new ones trained to go back to peacetime 
business. This must be compared with profits considered fair for con­
tractors who are using the same machines, the same organization set-up, 
the same production line, the same kind of employes trained in the same 
way to do the same job they were doing in peacetime, and who, after 
the war is over, are likely to go ahead doing the same kind of business. 
All these and many other things enter into a judgment as to what 
is or is not an excessive profit for a particular company under a particular 
set of circumstances; and there necessarily must be a mystery in the 
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process, because the workings of the mind are mysterious. Three represen­
tatives of the government, sitting in a room and hearing identical facts, 
will often arrive at different figures. When this happens they discuss 
the matter among themselves until they are able to reach a determination 
which they are willing to agree upon and to present to the contractor. 
No one can tell how another man's mind works; indeed no one can 
describe in satisfactory detail the way in which his own mind has worked. 
It is sometimes possible to state, and the Boards often do state, the major 
factors to which they gave consideration, but there are so many things in 
the course of a presentation that affect a man's judgment that it would be 
impossible to mention them all. 
After the Price Adjustment Boards have determined on a figure 
which they believe to be the proper one, if they cannot convince the con­
tractor that it is proper, or if the contractor cannot bring them to his own 
views, there may be ah impasse. In the case of the Army, if there is an 
impasse in one of the district Price Adjustment Sections, the case goes up 
to the headquarters of the service involved. If there should be an impasse 
there, the case goes to the Price Adjustment Board of the Wa r Depart­
ment. In any department, if there should be an impasse with the Price 
Adjustment Board of the Department, the Board would certify the matter 
to the responsible head of the department, who would then be faced with 
the necessity of determining what he should do. Since that has never yet 
had to be done, I can't say what any of them would do. There are 
several things they might do. Presumably, they would make a finding of 
the amount of excessive profits. Then they could issue an order for the 
withholding of payments to the contractor in the amount necessary to 
make up the excessive amount; or if nothing were due they could bring 
suit in court; or they might choose to turn the contractor over to a legis­
lative body for public investigation. This is pure speculation, however, 
because we have had no such cases to date. 
Contractors often ask if there is some percentage they can apply. 
There is not. Percentages in one line of business may be very different 
from those in another line of business. For example, a company that 
purchases in large quantities standard commodities, which it assembles 
into units to be sold to the government, may do 3 or 4 or 10 per cent 
of the work required to produce them. That company's profit from the 
sale of the product of this job should bear nowhere near the same relation­
ship to its selling price to the government as should that allowed a com­
pany which manufactured the parts from raw material and assembled 
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them. Because its risks are much greater, a company that requires a great 
deal of capital to perform a job should not be expected to work on as 
small a margin as one which requires but a small amount of capital. Unless 
they are m the same field of production a company with a rapid turnover 
of it capital, 10, 12, 15 times in a year, is not entitled to as large a margin 
per dollar of sales as the one which can turn over its capital but once. On 
the other hand, of two concerns engaged in the same kind of manufac­
turing, the one able to turn over its capital the greater number of times 
has a better organization, is a more efficient operator, and should con­
sequently be compensated at a higher rate. 
It is impossible to say what the percentage may be. The Truman 
Committee reported that the percentage range is from .4 of 1 per cent 
to 22 per cent of sales. I can say that to date, in cases where excessive 
profits were recovered, over 92 per cent of the settlements did not exceed 
15 per cent, and that 65 per cent of the settlements with all the Boards 
allowed profits which ranged between 7 per cent and 13 per cent of 
adjusted sales. But that doesn't tell you much about your own individual 
company. Your company may be one of that group that is entitled to a 
profit of .4 of I per cent, or of 1 or 2 per cent of sales, or it may be one 
of those that is entitled to a margin of 20 or 22 per cent. Those are the 
facts which, in the process of renegotiation, must be determined on a judg­
ment basis. So far as the members of the Boards have been able to deter­
mine, it is only on this basis that renegotiation can be conducted in a way 
which will yield equitable results to all companies. 
Many company executives talk about "leaving it to the income-tax 
department to take care of." Usually those who hold that opinion either 
fail to recognize that, if the income-tax department takes care of it, income-
tax rates will be materially increased, or are identified with companies with 
profits so high that they conclude that the income tax rates can never be 
increased sufficiently to absorb their excessive profits without putting other 
companies out of business. 
American businessmen are very short-sighted if they do not recognize 
that private enterprise cannot exist in this country after the war if it is 
charged with many serious indictments. Many prominent businessmen, 
and some who are not so prominent, very much fear that, in view of all 
the various forces, if there are any scandals with respect to business and 
its participation in the war effort, similar to those which were disclosed 
after the last war, there is a serious danger of retribution. 
There.are in the world today a number of forces working toward 
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the elimination of private enterprise. If business is charged with this last 
straw of scandalous profit, of scandalous exploitation of the government 
in time of need, when the boys are being asked to give their all, and of 
saddling the burden on the backs of the taxpayers, it is going to be very 
dangerous, and the far-seeing businessmen in this country recognize that. 
As a result, some of the biggest and best of our corporate enterprises in 
this country have been some of the easiest to renegotiate. Some of them 
have renegotiated themselves, have come in with proposals to refund 
amounts as much as, and in some instances more than, the Price Adjust­
ment Boards would have asked for, because they see and recognize that 
danger to private business enterprise. 
For those who actually go into renegotiation, one of the biggest 
headaches is the preparation of material to be considered by a Board, par­
ticularly the determination of what business is renegotiable and what is not 
renegotiable. Any direct business with one of the five departments that 
 mentioned is subject to renegotiation. Any subcontractor under any 
direct contract—and not merely the immediate subcontractor, but sub, 
sub, sub, sub, sub, all the way back to the beginning—who produces some­
thing which enters into the end product purchased by one of these govern­
ment departments is also subject to renegotiation. 
Th e subcontractor is renegotiated, not by his customer, but directly 
by the government, so that the excessive profits which he as a subcontractor 
made from sales to a contractor, who in turn sold to the government or 
to another contractor, so that the work of each became a part of what 
eventually was delivered to the government, may return to the government 
directly rather than by the line of profit accumulation. 
A manufacturer of machinery or equipment which is used in pro­
cessing soemething, the end use of which falls into this renegotiable cate­
gory, is subject to renegotiation, and anyone who makes any of the material 
which enters into the manufacture of that machinery and equipment which 
is to be used in the processing of something, the end use of which is for 
one of these fire departments, is subject to renegotiation. 
Real estate sold directly to one of these departments, or anything 
which becomes a part of such real estate, is subject to renegotiation. 
On the other hand, sales made to other agencies of the government, 
such as Defense Plant Corporation, Defense Supplies Corporation, or the 
Department of Agriculture, are not subject to renegotiation, no matter 
how excessive the profits therefrom. If, however, the contractor wants 
them renegotiated they may be included, but only if they do not reduce 
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the amount of the excessive profit which Would otherwise be determined. 
Under those circumstances the Boards are willing to consider them as a 
part of the business subject to the renegotiation process, in order to enable 
the contractor to state that he has made a clean slate of renegotiable and 
non-renegotiable business with the government, and to say, "We did not 
make any excessive profits. We turned all of it back to the government." 
The Boards will not subject a contractor to the risk of a gift tax because 
he gave it back to the government in some other way. Any taxes which 
have been paid on excessive earnings are credited against the amounts 
refunded as the result of renegotiation. 
With respect to what is not renegotiable, there are certain specific 
exemptions. For example, perishable commodities have been exempted. 
Both the Quartermaster Corps of the Army and the Navy have prepared 
lists of such items. Products of a mine, a well, of timber, or of other 
natural resources, which have not been processed beyond the form or state 
where they are first suitable for industrial use, are exempt. The purpose 
of that type of exemption was to encourage the holders of natural resources 
to deplete them for the sake of the war effort, despite high taxes, rather 
than to do what would normally be to their best interests; namely, to keep 
them undisturbed until they could withdraw them more gradually, with 
lower taxes, and so forth. 
Sales (whether to a contractor or to a subcontractor), which will 
neither become part of an end product for one of these fiYt departments 
nor a piece of machinery or equipment to be used in processing an end 
product, nor a part of such machinery or equipment, are exempt. In other 
words, desks, tables, adding machines, typewriters, writing paper, and 
things of that kind, which are bought by a manufacturer, whether he be a 
prime contractor or a subcontractor, are not subject to renegotiation. 
Of those types of sales which, if made at the present time, are subject 
to renegotiation, those which were made on contracts not completed and 
fully paid for by April 28, 1942, are also subject to renegotiation. 
If you had a contract entered into in July, 1941, for 100,000 units of 
a product, deliveries of which were to be made on order over the ensuing 
year, and some of the orders had not been placed or some of the orders had 
not been paid for prior to April 28, 1942, all of the deliveries under that 
contract are legally subject to renegotiation. 
All those deals which were completed although not paid for prior to 
Pearl Harbor, the Boards are inclined to look upon with a pretty lenient eye. 
They do not feel that a profit, even though made with the government, if 
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accumulated prior to Pearl Harbor, is as excessive as one relatively as large 
acquired after Pearl Harbor. That is the judgment of the men who have 
been formulating the policy pertinent to the administration of the Re­
negotiation Act. 
This results in some long-term contracts being renegotiated even 
though the deliveries were made as early as 1939 and 1940, since they 
were not completed and fully paid for by April 28, 1942. 
The necessity for making the cut-off at April 28, 1942, provides 
a big job for accountants. Some contractors have been able to trace their 
sales readily, not only those which are not renegotiable because paid for 
before April 28, 1942, but also those which must be distinguished between 
renegotiable and non-renegotiable business, because of their end use or for 
other reasons. From the type of sale they know the end product, no 
matter how many hands it may go through to reach the government. A 
company which manufactures something for airplanes, for example, doesn't 
have to make special inquiries to learn its ultimate destination, but knows 
it is going into airplanes that have been bought and will be paid for by one 
of the branches of the government, and that sales of it are renegotiable. 
There are many such products, concerning which there is no doubt about 
renegotiability. 
On the other hand, many manufactured articles may be used for 
civilian use, while others of the same type are required by the government, 
and that presents a more difficult problem, which has caused a great deal 
of work for some companies. One man told me that his company had 
nearly 100 people working for the best part of three months, scrutinizing 
every invoice to ascertain the end use of every sale, and, when they 
couldn't tell from the invoice, following it down through the buyer. That 
was an unnecessary and unreasonable amount of work for that job. No 
general rules can be laid down, but in every company there is some 
reasonable approach to the problem, some way by which the company can, 
by a sample test, by a recognition of types of product, or by an inquiry 
as to the industry into which the products are flowing, closely approximate 
the correct amount of its renegotiable business. Anything sold to the 
railroads or public utilities, for example, is non-renegotiable. Frequently, 
the segregation can be made on the basis of classes, but if that is not feasible, 
a reasonable sample of invoices will usually suggest a fair basis of allocation. 
Let me warn you, however, not to go ahead with a segregation 
procedure without getting clearance on it, lest the price adjustment 
authorities find some holes after you have done a lot of fruitless work on it. 
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The Boards try to be reasonable. Most of the renegotiators are businessmen 
who were not connected with the government a year ago, men who were 
in active business or who had retired from active business, but who know 
business problems and the factors which enter into business risks and business 
judgments, and they try to do the job of renegotiation on a businesslike 
basis. Most of the accountants who work under them have been senior 
or semi-senior staff accountants, with public accounting firms. While 
they may not in all cases be fully qualified, though most of them are, to 
make the best judgments, they are charged with checking and clearing 
with someone who is qualified. Consider your own case or the case of the 
company that is your client, if you are a public accountant. Then, knowing 
more about the business than anybody else, certainly more than any Price 
Adjustment Section man could learn in months, design what you consider 
to be a fair, reasonable, business-like way of doing the job, one which 
you would be willing to accept if you were sitting in the renegotiator's 
seat, and then submit it to the Board or Section assigned to your case. 
Explain your problem, discuss it. Let them punch holes in it, if there are 
any; if they find none, they will approve it, and you can go ahead with 
your job, but don't make the segregation through one of these terribly 
detailed procedures. There is no question but that the job of segregation 
is very important. It is, in fact, the heart of the renegotiation, because, 
until the amount of the renegotiable business and the profits flowing from 
it are known, there is no basis for renegotiation. So go about it in a 
reasonable way. 
What about the accounting procedures? Generally accepted account­
ing principles and practices are recognized by the Price Adjustment Boards. 
A method of cost allocation offered consistently over a period of years, 
unless it seems to be grossly out of line or unreasonable under the circum­
stances, is likely to be accepted. If there has been a change in your oper­
ations to which your previous method of costing isn't applicable, use what 
you think is a fair procedure under the new conditions and present that 
method for approval. 
Since the Price Adjustment Sections want to know on what basis you 
allocate your renegotiable and non-renegotiable business, and what principles 
you use for spreading overhead, factory burden, general administrative, 
advertising, consulting expenses, and so forth, present these matters clearly 
and concisely, and on a basis that you can justify before these men sitting 
here today. I will guarantee that if you can justify your methods before 
them, you can justify them before the Price Adjustment Board, 
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CHAIRMAN HAWK: I am sure that the remarks of Mr. Blough raised a lot 
of questions in your minds, which you would like to ask him, but I think it would 
be advisable to postpone the questions until the end of the session, so if you will 
just jot them down so you won't forget them we will get to them as soon as the 
other speakers have finished. 
The next topic for discussion this morning is "War-Contract Termination 
Problems." It has been receiving a great deal of attention lately, not only in 
accounting journals but in the public press as well. It is a subject of great interest 
to all war contractors and their accountants. 
The first speaker on this subject will be Mr. George S. Olive. Mr. Olive is 
the president of the American Institute of Accountants. He is a certified public 
accountant of Indiana, and has served as treasurer and president of the Indiana 
Association of Certified Public Accountants. 
Long active in public affairs in Indianapolis, where he is senior partner of 
George S. Olive and Company, he has contributed much to the development of 
his city and state. He is a past president, and at present a vice-president and 
chairman, of the Industrial Commission of the Indianapolis Chamber of Com­
merce, and is also vice-president and chairman of the Tax Committee of the 
Indiana State Chamber of Commerce. 
Mr. Olive has been a member of the American Institute of Accountants 
since 1919. Since 1929, he has been continuously active in the affairs of the 
Institute, serving on various committees, including those on education, professional 
advancement, public affairs, natural business year, appointment of auditors and 
cooperation with bar associations. He has been chairman of the Institute 
Committee on Cooperation with the Bureau of Economic Research. 
Prior to his election as president of the American Institute, in 1942, Mr. 
Olive served in the period 1922-29 and 1937-4.1 as a member of the Council 
of the Institute, and, in the period 1940-4.1, as a member of the executive 
committee. He was vice-president of the Institute for the 1941-42 term. 
Having had the privilege of attending the Council meeting of the American 
Institute of Accountants at New York last week, I know that Mr. Olive has a 
close personal contact with the very active committees of the Institute who are 
working on the problems of war-contract terminations. I know that he will have 
an interesting message for us. Mr. Olive. 
WAR CONTRACT TERMINATION PROBLEMS 
By GEORGE S. OLIVE, C.P.A. 
George 5. Olive ^Company, Indianafolis; President^ The 
American Institute of Accountants 
The termination of war contracts for the convenience of the Gov­
ernment may take place under either of two major conditions: (a) by 
termination of individual contracts during the course of the war; or (b) 
by termination of contracts on a large scale at the conclusion of hostilities, 
or shortly thereafter. The serious economic dislocations and problems 
resulting from the latter condition are exemplified by the situation pre­
vailing at the close of World War L The Wa r Department, on November 
I I  , 1918, had contracts outstanding amounting to $7.5 billion. One 
company has already received contracts during the second World War 
to that amount. The Wa r Department had about 30,000 contracts out­
standing on Armistice Day, some of which were informal and required later 
legalization. By November 11, 1919, 22,500 had been adjusted, and by 
September, 1920, less than 1,000 remained for settlement. Recognizing 
the importance to the country's economy, the Government disposed of its 
contractual obligations with reasonable expedition. 
On those contracts which were completed or practically completed, 
the War Department paid in full. There were unfinished contracts sus­
pended on November 11, 1918, amounting to $3,834 million. Of these, 
$3,330 million were settled for $437 million, or about 13 per cent. 
The Navy did as well. Of 1,495 contracts in force on Armistice Day, 
835, amounting to $23 million, were cancelled without liability. On 194 
contracts,, amounting to another $23 million, the Government paid $3/4 
million. On the other 466 contracts, the work was complete, or so nearly 
complete as to make cancellation impracticable, and payment was made 
in full. By November, 1919, only 128 Navy contracts and orders 
remained for settlement. 
It doesn't take much of a prophet to guess that the Government 
won't get off as cheaply this time; if it does, there will be many a company 
missing when Standard Statistics calls the roll the following year. 
While the problem of wholesale cancellation of contracts at the con­
clusion of the last war will no doubt be with us again and create similar 
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difficulties, the problem of current termination of individual contracts is 
already with us on a fairly large scale. Reasons for such termination 
include: changes in procurement requirements of the armed forces; over­
supply of some materials and equipment in proportion to the current needs 
therefore; inability to obtain sufficient basic materials to complete certain 
contracts on their originally scheduled basis; and failure of the contractor 
in some cases to perform the contract satisfactorily. These conditions are 
becoming more prevalent, due to the fact that the tremendous increase in 
wartime production during the past few years is now reaching a plateau, 
and cannot be expected to increase further very materially in excess of 
the present very high rate. Fortunately, the present problems are not so 
acute as they probably will be at the end of the war, due to the present 
ability to use inventories of materials on other contracts, or by other con­
tractors, and the great over-all demand for war production, in contrast to 
a general reduction in production at the end of the war and virtual dis­
appearance at that time of the demand for munitions. Furthermore, the 
marked drop in the demand for basic materials, and especially war products, 
at the end of the war may create a severe drop in the market values of 
inventories of materials and equipment especially designed for war pro­
duction. These serious conditions are not present now, and, therefore, 
do not have an important bearing on present terminations. 
.Businessmen and representatives of the Government are already 
becoming apprehensive of the possible ramifications of wholesale termination 
at the end of the present war, however desirable may be termination of 
the war itself. This feeling is based in large part upon the large volume 
of contracts terminated at the conclusion of World War I, and the fact 
that the present volume of contracts outstanding is perhaps ten times as 
great as in 1918. Furthermore, the serious delays in the completion of 
termination settlements of some contracts at the end of the last war, 
running in many cases to several years, are also an ominous reminder 
of difficulties ahead. Alert and far-seeing individuals, therefore, are now 
recommending that post-war problems, especially in respect to contract 
terminations, be anticipated at the present time and every means be utilized 
to alleviate such problems as much as possible. It is reassuring that not 
only industry but the fiscal and procurement divisions of the Armed 
Forces are keenly aware of the crucial character of termination settlements 
and are striving to devise a sound groundwork. 
Since so many contractors have most or a large part of their working 
capital tied up in war contracts, cancellation of such contracts, either 
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during the course of the war or at its termination, obviously will place a 
strain upon such working capital in the liquidation of liabilities, especially 
if reimbursement from the Government is delayed to any extent. In this 
connection, provision should be made for correlating settlements of con­
tracts with the Government and of subcontracts with the same prime 
contractor. Another problem is the continuing of substantial numbers of 
employees on the pay roll if no work is forthcoming, or the alternative of 
discharging employees and possibly providing for termination wages; in 
either case, funds are necessary. Certain regulation V loans and advances 
by the Government to contractors often contain provisions for delaying 
the liquidation of such obligations to assist contractors in making termin­
ation adjustments. 
Whether taking place currently or at the end of hostilities, the prob­
lems of contract termination are manifold. Basically, they stem from legal 
considerations as to: termination provisions in each contract; interpretation 
of such provisions; and governmental regulations covering procedures of 
the Government and the contractor under termination settlements. In 
order to understand properly the accounting and auditing problems arising 
out of contract termination, it is necessary first to consider the nature of 
contract provisions for termination, which are the fundamental legal 
authority to guide the termination procedures. 
SIGNIFICANCE OF TERMINATION ARTICLES 
Much discussion is current today about "termination articles." This 
expression has led to a good deal of confusion among laymen, some even 
thinking that it refers to published papers. Actually, it is a technical term 
referring to that section or sections of the written contract which make 
provision for termination. Contracts presently in operation include a wide 
variety of such articles providing for termination for the convenience of the 
Government, their contents as to the determination of termination claims of 
contractors varying from elaborate formulae to a mere statement that the 
contractor will be reimbursed for costs incurred plus a reasonable profit. 
In addition to the difficulties resulting from the wide variety of 
contract articles, as previously defined, the so-called standard articles fre­
quently in use are unsatisfactory. For instance, article 14 of the standard 
fixed-price supply contract of the War Department (Form No. 1) requires 
the contractor to discontinue work, cancel orders, and terminate sub­
contracts chargeable to the contract, and transfer title to the Government 
covering completed and partially completed supplies and related items. It 
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also requires the Government to pay the contractor for all completed items 
at the contract price and for the uncompleted portion of the contract, 
amounts representing reimbursement for actual expenditures applicable 
thereto and expenditures made in connection with the settling of obliga­
tions applicable thereto; plus payment for the profit on the uncompleted 
portion, computed as follows: Multiply the estimated profit which would 
have been realized on the uncompleted portion of the contract, if completed 
at prevailing rates, by the estimated percentage of completion of the un­
completed portion of the contract at the time of termination. 
While the foregoing provisions are intended to be equitable to both the 
Government and the contractor, many problems obviously arise, such as the 
determination of the amount of profit which would have been realized and 
the percentage of completion of the uncompleted portion. Furthermore, the 
segregating of the costs applicable to the uncompleted portion from those 
applicable to the completed portion present many complications. 
For some time the Wa r Production Board has been working on 
a revision of article 14 of the Wa r Department fixed-price supply contract 
with the hope of arriving at a standard article which might be applicable 
to all such contracts with all departments of the Government. Early drafts 
of this standard article contain an elaborate method for determining the 
amount of termination claims, which includes calculation of profit on the 
continued and discontinued portions of a contract at separate agreed-upon 
rates. Entirely aside from the merits or shortcomings of the settlement 
formula, the desirability of a uniform termination article cannot be too 
strongly emphasized. 
Notwithstanding the existing termination articles and the one proposed 
by the War Production Board, officers in the Fiscal Division of the Wa r 
Department are now preparing a manual for administrative audit of termin­
ation claims of fixed-price supply contractors which contemplates the 
settling of terminated contracts on a negotiated basis, as provided in their 
procurement regulations. This manual, which will be discussed in more 
detail subsequently, suggests the settlement of contracts on the basis of the 
total costs incurred, without a segregation between completed and uncom­
pleted work. It provides generally that completed work will be reimbursed 
at the contract price, and that reimbursement for the uncompleted portion 
will be determined by deducting payments already made and to be made 
for completed work from the sum total costs incurred on the contract and 
profit thereon at an agreed rate. Such rate must not exceed the indicated 
rate, as determined by the contracting officer; but in the case of an 
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indicated loss on a given contract, the contractor is to be reimbursed for his 
estimated cost applicable to the uncompleted portion, and at the contract 
price for the completed portion. Despite this provision, however, the manual 
emphasizes the total costs incurred on a given contract, rather than making 
a distinction between the costs of the completed and uncompleted portions, 
as is contemplated in existing termination articles and the WP B formula. 
Eric Camman recently suggested before the wartime conference of 
the American Management Association, in New York, that, in lieu of a 
detailed uniform termination article, a general article be inserted in con­
tracts, and a joint statement of termination policy be prepared by the 
interested departments of the Government, providing for: rapid settlement 
of claims; application of advance payments; a clear basis for reimbursement 
of costs incurred on uncompleted work, plus a reasonable profit; and the 
arbitration of only disputed portions of a contract. This procedure would 
be a practical approach to a difficult problem, securing the benefits of 
uniformity in contract provisions without sacrificing flexibility in the applica­
tion of termination procedures to individual contracts. 
ACCOUNTING PROBLEMS 
Despite variations in termination articles of individual contracts and 
policies of different governmental bodies, most settlements of termination 
claims contemplate reimbursement to the contractor or sub-contractor for 
costs incurred and an allowance for profit. While determination of both 
cost and profit is primarily an accounting matter, the usual rules of account­
ing must necessarily be modified to some extent in the event of termination 
by considerations of government policy. As in the case of cost-plus-fixed-
fee contracts, the Government does not recognize, as allowable items of 
cost for contract purposes, all costs actually incurred by the contractor and 
required to be recouped by him to prevent a loss. Since there is no established 
sales price when a fixed-price contract is terminated before completion, the 
question of allowable profit is largely a matter of government policy as to 
the amount to be allowed and the method of its determination. 
In a way, terminated fixed-price contracts are thus reduced to a 
cost-plus profit basis. However, this arrangement should be distinguished 
from both the cost-plus-a-percentage-of-cost type of contract used in World 
War I and the currently popular cost-plus-fixed-fee contract, since in both 
cases the contractor is assured at the outset of being reimbursed for his 
costs as well as an allowance for profit. In the case of terminated fixed-
price contracts, on the other hand, there is no assurance at the outset that 
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the contractor will recover all his costs or how much profit he will make. 
His risk is thus considerably greater than on so-called cost-plus contracts. 
For this reason, the Government is usually more liberal in recognizing 
items of cost and in the rate of profit allowed. It also does not consider 
such terminations as in violation of existing statutes prohibiting the use of 
cost-plus~a-percentage-of-cost contracts. 
Termination articles in contracts generally contain little guidance to 
the determination of applicable cost other than the statement that settle­
ment shall be based in part on total costs incurred or costs of the uncom­
pleted portion and authorized expenditures incident to the termination. 
The provisions of T  D 5000 and of the so-called "green book" may be of 
some assistance, although these documents are more applicable to cost-
plus-fixed-fee contracts, and even then are not always followed. The 
previously mentioned Wa r Department manual for administrative audit 
of termination claims of fixed-price supply contractors, however, does 
contain a section on the determination of allowable costs, which sets forth 
basic principles of cost accounting to be applied in termination settlements. 
Pending the formal release of this manual, reference may be made to the 
audit manual, which has already been incorporated as section F in the 
Army Ordnance procurement instructions. These instructions will prob­
ably be revised to conform precisely with the general termination manual 
of the Wa r Department when the latter is released* but the changes are 
not expected to be material. 
Chapter .5 of the Ordnance manual, headed "Principles of Cost 
Determination," contains the following general statement as to the allow­
ance of costs: 
These provisions permit the allowance of those costs incurred which are 
incident to and necessary for the performance of the contract, are reasonable in 
amount and are stated in accordance with recognized accounting practices con­
strued and applied in such manner as in the judgment of the Contracting Officer 
will carry out the purpose of the Article. 
It is significant to note that, as indicated in the above quotation, the 
so-called Contracting Officer possesses extensive authority in the matter 
of passing on allowable items of cost and in settling the contract, regard­
less of other provisions therefor. Of further significance is the fact that 
"contracting officer" is a nominal expression loosely applied to designate 
the officer who signs a contract, and whose rank may be high or very 
moderate. Since many of these officers are not trained accountants, the 
attainment of an equitable settlement in termination in many cases depends 
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upon the extent to which the contracting officer utilizes the services of 
competent government accountants to assist him. 
This section of the manual contains the further statement that "costs 
may include, in addition to those directly chargeable to the contract, a 
proper proportion of indirect expenses or overhead." It describes various 
kinds of costs which may be allowed under certain circumstances, includ­
ing: a reasonable allowance for depreciation at appropriate rates, including 
obsolescence; costs of designing and producing special tools; claims for 
loss of useful value of facilities; institutional advertising; experimental 
and research expenses; franchise and excise taxes; and accounting, legal, 
clerical and other expenses in connection with the termination of the 
contract. 
In no less than six instances, the allowability of costs is limited by 
the statement that they be "in accordance with recognized accounting 
practices." While accountants generally will welcome such a reference 
as implying practical and flexible interpretations of cost for purposes of 
termination, the question might well arise as to what are recognized 
accounting practices for various cost elements. Since such practices natur­
ally vary under the circumstances of different cases, no fixed rules of 
procedure can properly be set forth to cover all cases. However, certain 
types of cost may cause difficulty in the determination of their applicability 
to terminated contracts, and, therefore, it would be helpful if official 
pronouncements could be made as to such items for the guidance of 
contractors and contracting officers alike. It has already been suggested 
that the appropriate bodies in the War and Navy Departments issue joint 
statements interpreting troublesome cost items under contract terminations 
similar to the cost interpretations already issued by the Wa r Department 
for application to CPF F contracts. As in the latter case, it would be 
especially desirable to have such interpretations reviewed by a competent 
body of practicing accountants before their ultimate release. 
The Ordnance termination manual also sets forth certain cost items 
which may not be recognized in termination, such as amortization of 
emergency facilities provided for under section 124 of the Internal Revenue 
Code; advertising other than a proper proportion of institutional advertis­
ing; losses on other contracts; losses from sale or exchange of capital 
assets; legal and accounting fees in connection with reorganizations, anti­
trust litigation and prosecution of claims against the Government; losses 
on investments; provision for contingencies; fines and penalties arising 
from failure to perform government contracts; conversion of facilities to 
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other uses 5 expenses resulting from failure to discontinue obligations 
promptly after termination notice; and costs incurred in excess of the 
reasonable contract requirements. The unallowable costs are generally 
similar to those set forth in T  D 5000, the "green book," and renegotia­
tion statements, although the provisions for any one of these purposes are 
not necessarily applicable to the others. 
In addition to the specific restrictions on allowable costs, the manual 
requires as an over-all limit that the aggregate allowance shall not exceed 
the contract price payable if the contract had been completed, less the 
amount of all costs estimated to be required to complete the contract. 
This is in effect the common law formula for the settlement of terminated 
contracts. 
As already indicated, the accounting problems arising out of contract 
termination are basically those of cost accounting and the determination 
of cost. Such determination, however, should be distinguished from cost 
for purposes of CPFF contracts, due to differences in governmental policy 
as to allowability, which already have been mentioned, and differences in 
operation. Under CPF F contracts the contractor must submit cost 
accounting data currently to the Government as a basis for reimbursement, 
whereas under contract termination the costs for an entire contract, or at 
least for the terminated portion, are determined all at once and form the 
basis for a single claim against the Government, which is often subject 
to protracted negotiations before final settlement. 
Th e question of allowability of individual items of cost is primarily 
a matter of government policy. However, the determination of the 
amounts of allowable items is basically a matter of cost accounting. Direct 
charges to a contract are not only easier to determine, as a rule, but are 
generally more likely to be accepted by the contracting officer. Indirect 
charges, on the other hand, are much more difficult to determine, are 
scrutinized much more carefully by the Government, and present the 
major accounting problem in termination. 
Th e main problem in the determination of indirect charges applicable 
to terminated contracts is that of the allocation of indirect costs to individual 
contracts. Under some termination provisions, such as the standard War 
Department article, there is a further problem of allocating indirect costs 
between the completed and uncompleted portions of a terminated contract. 
Obviously, any method of overhead allocation must be reasonable and 
bear a proper relation to the work thereby charged. Any amounts charged 
to terminated contracts must have some relation to the work to be accepted. 
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Another problem of primary significance in terminations is that of 
inventory-taking and recording. Since termination comes before the com­
pletion of a contract, there will usually be inventories of raw materials, 
work in process, and finished goods applying to the contract. The finished 
goods can usually be billed to the Government at the contract price. Work 
in process will usually be a legitimate part of the termination claims, but 
the ever-present problem of costing such inventory may present some dif­
ficulties. This part of the inventory will usually be the major element in 
the termination claim, both in amount and significance. 
While the inventory of raw materials will probably involve no dif­
ficulties as to cost, problems arise as to its applicability to the contract, and, 
in the case of common materials, how much, if any, can be charged to 
the contract. 
A final inventory problem of real consequence is the proper account­
ing for the physical location, condition and control of the inventory, espe­
cially that which is part of the' termination claim, since ownership then 
would vest in the Government and the contractor would be an agent of 
the Government. Such inventory consequently should be properly protected 
and accounted for. 
Another accounting problem involved in termination is the control 
over expenditures in an effort to stop the incurring of expenditures on the 
contract as soon after the termination of the contract as possible; otherwise, 
such expenditures will not be paid for by the Government. 
Since the contractor has primary responsibility for the claims of sub­
contractors under termination, the former should maintain adequate records 
and controls over the costs and billings of subcontractors. As is indicated 
hereafter, the contractor may have to make an actual audit of his sub­
contractors to substantiate the latters3 claims. 
AUDITING PROBLEMS 
The usual procedure following termination of a contract is for the 
contractor to prepare a claim for reimbursement in accordance with the 
applicable termination article, and to submit it to the Contracting Officer. 
The latter may either accept the claim on the basis of an office review or 
require substantiation thereof through a field visit by a governmental 
auditor. It is the work of this auditor which is discussed herein. 
Understanding of the work of the government auditor may perhaps 
best be obtained by reference to the previously mentioned manual for ad­
ministrative audit of termination vclaims of fixed-price supply contractors, 
already issued by the Army Ordnance Division and still under consideration 
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by the Fiscal Division of the Wa r Department. In addition to the afore­
mentioned section dealing with principles of cost determination, the manual 
includes a description of the general plan of settlement and of the con-
tractor's procedures in preparing his claim, and material for consideration 
by the auditor as to the contractor's internal procedures, application of 
selective audit procedures and working papers and reports. 
It is especially significant to note that emphasis is placed in the manual 
on test-audit as opposed to a detailed audit. In this respect the auditor is 
advised to consider: the size and complexity of the claim; extent of infor­
mation supplied by the contractor; propriety of procedures and accuracy 
of computations apparent from an office review of the claim; reports of 
independent accountants; and the system of internal control of the con­
tractor. The auditor may also give consideration to the previous exam­
inations of the contractor's accounts in connection with cost-plus-fixed-fee 
contracts, renegotiation, O P A audits, etc. 
It should be emphasized that the final decisions in termination rest 
with the Contracting Officer. The auditor merely assists such officer 
by obtaining such factual information as he deems necessary in the 
circumstances. 
As a matter of government policy, it has been suggested that audits 
of termination claims by the various government departments be coordin­
ated in a manner similar to renegotiation, so that unnecessary duplication 
will be avoided. Such joint undertakings might well be supervised by the 
Audit Coordination Committees of the Army and Navy, which are already 
coordinating audit work on CPF F contracts and time and material vendors' 
charges. 
While the government auditor and Contracting Officer may no doubt 
benefit considerably by decisions of price adjustment boards and the work 
of cost analysis sections in connection with renegotiation of contracts, the 
functions of renegotiation and audit on termination claims should be kept 
distinct, and the work of each body should not enter the province of the 
other. 
In the Ordnance manual previously referred to, it is interesting to 
note the special importance given to audit working papers. From the 
professional accountant's viewpoint, the following comments contained in 
the manual are of particular interest: 
Working papers serve two major purposes: (1) they are an essential historical 
record of the auditing procedures carried out and of all significant data and 
findings incident to and arising out of the audit; (2) they are an important 
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means of currently administering the auditing work. Working papers should 
therefore be prepared in such form as to achieve those objectives to the maximum 
extent. 
The detailed and specific instructions contained in the manual con­
cerning the form of preparation, the indexing, and the preservation of 
working papers could be read with profit by all students of accounting. 
As to specific audit procedures, special consideration must be given 
by the auditor to the physical inventories at the time of termination, and 
the proper segregation of various elements therein, such as raw material, 
work in process, and finished goods applicable to the contract and to other 
work, material returnable to vendors, damaged materials, government-
owned property, etc. 
Special consideration is given by the auditors to indirect costs and 
their allocation to the contract. As' previously indicated, direct charges 
are usually more acceptable to the auditors than indirect costs. Scrutiny 
of the method of allocating the latter is particularly significant where other 
contracts and non-government work are concerned. 
It is the Government's policy that prime contractors should assume 
the primary responsibility for claims of subcontractors in termination. 
Before such claims are accepted, it may be necessary in some cases for 
the prime contractor, or his independent accountants, to make an examin­
ation of varying extent of the subcontractor's claim. There may be cases, 
however, where it would be more expedient for the Government to under­
take such audits, especially where several contracts are involved, where 
the amounts are very large, or where the same contractor has both prime 
contracts and subcontracts subject to termination. Another factor in favor 
of a government audit of subcontracts is that peculiar relationship between 
contractors and their subcontractors resulting from their private dealings 
and the fact that the prime contractor is usually reimbursed for payments 
to subcontractors. 
No discussion of governmental audits of war contracts would be 
complete without mention of the activities of the Institute's new committee 
on government audit of contractors' costs. This committee has rendered 
valuable assistance and advice to the War and Navy Departments in the 
preparation of cost interpretations and audit manuals, such as the one 
now in process. Following a review of various drafts of the latter docu­
ment and consultation with War Department officers, the committee 
recently submitted a letter to the Director of the Fiscal Division, Head­
quarters, Army Service Forces, embodying fifteen specific recommendations 
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with respect to government policy and accounting and auditing procedures 
in the termination of war contracts. While there is no assurance that 
these recommendations will be accepted, they are indicative of probable 
trends. These recommendations may be summarized as follow: 
Re commendations of the Institute's Committee: 
(1) The Committee approves the principle of settling termination 
claims by negotiation between contracting officers and contractors, 
believing this method should assure fairer allowance and quicker settle­
ments than otherwise possible. 
(2) The Committee fosters a policy dealing with terminated 
contracts on the basis of total cost and reasonable profit, treating as 
partial payments amounts paid on account of deliveries. It opposes allo­
cation of costs between finished and unfinished portions of a terminated 
contract, believing the difficulties of fair apportionment preclude the use 
of the method. The Committee advocates the use of a reasonable rate 
of profit for the whole contract, after due consideration of the indicated 
rate of profit for the early stage of the contract. 
(3) The principle of allowing a proper proportion of ordinary 
going-concern expense, such as institutional advertising, research and 
development, Federal capital-stock tax, and interest, has been approved, 
emphasizing that such expenses are necessary to the continued existence 
of corporations (although not caused by specific contracts), and that 
grave anxiety exists concerning a fair recognition of these items. 
(4) On the subject of inventories, the Committee advocates an 
allocation of common materials to the needs of both war and civilian 
business, believing it inadvisable to discourage accumulation of materials 
required for uninterrupted flow of manufacture, because of the possi­
bility of arbitrary and inequitable treatment of such materials upon 
termination, while at the same time protecting Government against 
unreasonable accumulation. / 
(5) There is a basic requirement that the total allowance to a 
prime contractor and his various sub-contractors shall not exceed the 
total of the prime contract. Also, prime contractor and sub-contractor 
have rights and responsibilities arising from their relationship differing 
from those existing between prime contractor and Government. Never­
theless, the Committee has urged a broad participation by Government 
in the audit of sub-contractors, because of the many practical business 
difficulties involved in placing that responsibility solely upon prime 
contractors. 
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(6) The Manual tentatively provides, and the Committee concurs, 
that the same principles governing allowable costs shall apply to both 
contractors' and sub-contractors' claims. Particularly when a business 
manufactures under both prime and sub-contracts, the practical advan­
tages of uniform determination seem to require acceptance of this 
provision, despite the differences in relationship between the parties. 
(7) The Manual, apparently, will avoid prescription of allowable 
cost practices, relying instead upon generally recognized accounting 
procedures. The Committee, rightly, points out that the applicability 
of cost accounting practices depends upon detailed consideration of all 
the particular and peculiar circumstances in each case, and that generally 
accepted practices are sufficiently understood to assure reasonable agree­
ment among accountants. It has, therefore, concurred in a proposal to 
deal with unusual or debatable accounting practices arising in termination 
audits by referring them to the Accounting and Audit Supervisory 
Branch, and it has advocated that means be provided whereby the 
opinions of representative practicing accountants may be obtained quickly 
on important practices by reference to the Institute. The Committee 
has pointed out, also, that supplementary cost interpretations will be 
useful and satisfactory guides to contracting officers conducting termin­
ation audits. 
(8)Th e Committee has recommended that examining officers 
discuss their findings with contractors before submitting their reports, 
to assure every opportunity to contractors to present additional data and 
arguments while auditors are still in the field. 
(9) The Committee approves cooperation between contracting 
officers and Price Adjustment Boards, but without conflict between the 
respective functions of termination and renegotiation. 
(10) The Committee strongly urges mandatory partial payments, 
and prompt and full payment of any substantial portion of claims that 
shall have been satisfactorily verified by contracting officers. With due 
regard to advance payments where claims are delayed, partial payments 
up to 50 per cent or 60 per cent of claims have been urged under 
protective provisions, including the right to withhold where contracting 
officers certify that the interest of the Government may be jeopardized. 
(11) It has been urged that accounting procedures prescribed by 
the Manual be integrated with general termination procedure. 
(12) The Committee has stated that the most difficult cost deter­
minations relate to joint expenses affecting contracts for several Depart­
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ments or more than one branch of a Department. While joint costs 
require accurate allocation between terminated contracts on the one 
hand, and unterminated or civilian business on the other, such accuracy-
is not essential as to terminated contracts of various government depart­
ments. The Committee has recommended audits by a joint agency, to 
be called a Board of Contract Settlement, which should be advisory to 
contracting officers and should direct audits. In order to avoid duplica­
tion, to expedite procedure, and to assure uniform policy, such a Board 
seems highly desirable. 
(13) Were the Board established, the Committee urges that 
releases on cost practices emanating from the Accounting and Audit 
Supervisory Branch should be approved by representatives of all the 
procurement agencies. 
(14) The Committee expressed the belief that a large amount of 
auditing on terminations will be unavoidable in complex mixed-plant 
cases, requiring competently trained personnel educated to the particular 
termination problems. It urged the early establishment of policy, so 
that experience may be gained on current termination problems before 
"V " Day. 
(15) The Committee again urged that releases on cost practices 
be approved by the profession, through experienced practitioners familiar 
with the cost accounting practices of contractors. It pointed out that 
the Institute can serve industry, constructively, concerning the prin­
ciples of termination settlement and in advocating accounts and records 
readily disclosing the data needed for termination settlements. 
It should be obvious that the Committee's recommendation for the 
establishment of a joint agency to serve all of the military departments 
is of great importance, in that, by the development of uniform procedure 
in this difficult and complicated job of contract termination, a considerable 
saving in time and cost should be achieved. It is to be hoped that those 
charged with the administration of this work will give this recommendation 
the careful consideration it deserves. 
This discussion of problems involved in the termination of war con­
tracts has merely touched the highlights of this important subject. Much 
more could be said regarding the many detailed problems. For the present, 
however, it is hoped that this brief review of termination problems will 
serve as the introduction to a liberal education in this most important subject. 
CHAIRMAN HAWK: Due to the importance of our program this morning, I 
am going to ask your indulgence in omitting the usual seventh-inning' stretch 
and going on with our program. 
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The last speaker on the panel this morning is our own fellow member, 
Major Jacob B. Taylor. Perhaps a lot of us know a great deal about him that 
isn't on this sheet I have here, but, unfortunately, I must stick to the script. 
Major Taylor is stationed in Washington, where he is attached to the Fiscal 
Division, Headquarters, Army Service Forces, and has had direct contact with 
the many problems arising out of termination of war contracts. 
Major Taylor is a certified public accountant, registered in several states, 
and has had long experience in accounting and administrative work. He is a 
graduate of the University of Pennsylvania, and has taught accounting at the 
University of North Dakota and The Ohio State University, and has served 
as Chairman of the Department of Accounting at each University. At the present 
time he is on leave of absence from The Ohio State University. 
Prior to joining the military forces, Major Taylor was Director of the 
Liquor Department of the State of Ohio, and was granted a leave of absence 
from this position late in 1942. 
The Major is a member of the American Institute of Accountants and has 
served on several of its committees. He is also a member of the Ohio Society of 
Certified Public Accountants, and at one time served our organization as a director. 
He is a life member of the American Accounting Association and a past president 
of the Association. During his term as president, the American Accounting Asso­
ciation developed the Statement of Accounting Princifles> which was so widely 
discussed. Major Taylor was instrumental in the development of this statement. 
I now present Major Taylor, who will speak on the subject of "War 
Contract Termination Problems." Major Taylor. 
ACCOUNTING PROBLEMS ARISING FROM THE 
TERMINATION OF WAR DEPARTMENT 
FIXED-PRICE SUPPLY CONTRACTS 
By MAJO R JACOB B. TAYLOR 
Fiscal Dkrisioti) Headquarters} Army Service forces, Washington, D. C. 
Contracts between the United States Government and contractors 
covering the manufacture of the implements and accoutrements of war 
generally carry a provision which permits termination before completion 
at the pleasure and for the benefit of the Government. The standard 
termination article, which is included in many of such contracts, prescribes 
the procedures which are to be followed in the event of termination before 
completion. 
Terminations are taking place currently and will continue to do so, 
due to the changes in needs and specifications brought about by changing 
requirements and by experiences being gained in waging a global war. 
When the victory is eventually achieved, it will be necessary to terminate 
abruptly a large proportion, if not all, of the contracts for war supplies 
and purposes. Therefore, consideration of the possibility of and the prob­
lems incident to termination before completion of such contracts would 
seem, at this juncture, to be a pressing and imperative need. 
The Major Profortions of the Termination Problem 
With termination of war contracts on "V " Day, there will arise the 
urgent need to speed reconversion to peacetime operations. This will 
require that the working capital of the contractor which is tied up in claims 
arising from termination be returned to him as quickly as possible, so that 
he might proceed to convert to his regular business operations without delay. 
Upon the speed of reimbursement and the equity of the settlement will 
depend, to a large extent, the length of the lag between the cessation of 
war production and the full resumption of regular operations. 
In respect to the termination of fixed-price supply contracts, at least 
the following considerations will arise: 
a. The disposal of the tools, equipment, facilities, and inventories in the 
hands of the contractor. 
b. The need for immediate consideration of the contractor's claim for 
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reimbursement of his allowable costs arising out of termination and the speedy 
and final closing of this matter. 
c. The need for equitable consideration of the contractor's claim so that 
a portion of his capital will not be lost to him because of circumstances 
(termination) wholly beyond his control. 
The proper sale and allocation of tools, equipment, facilities, and 
inventories (belonging to the United States Government as a result of 
the prosecution of the war) in such a way as to disturb the economy to 
the least degree are matters for special consideration as a part of some 
general over-all plan for post-war operation of industry. While not 
minimizing the importance of such considerations, their treatment and 
discussion cannot properly be dealt with here. 
From the accounting viewpoint, the necessary procedures to provide 
for an equitable determination of the amount due to the contractor as a 
result of terminating a contract before completion and to secure speedy 
reimbursement after such determination are matters weighted with impor­
tance and fraught with implications of great interest. Therefore, the 
immediate attention of the accountant should be directed to these matters. 
The Standard Termination Article 
War Department Procurement Regulations (paragraph 324) require 
that every lump-sum supply contract, with minor exceptions, contain an 
article for the termination of the contract at the convenience of the 
Government. Among other things, this article provides: 
a. For the reimbursement of the contractor for all actual expenditures 
and costs with respect to the uncompleted portion of the contract. 
b. For paying the contractor a profit on the uncompleted portion of 
the contract. This profit allowance is based upon the Contracting Officer's 
estimate of the rate of profit which would have been realized if the contract 
had been completed. It also requires a determination of the percentage of 
completion of the uncompleted portion of the contract. 
c. For paying the contractor, with the approval of the Contracting Officer, 
costs incurred after the date of termination and costs of settlement of the contract. 
The termination article provides for a settlement through negotiation 
of the amounts due with respect to the uncompleted portion of the contract. 
In such a case, the Contracting Officer is given wide powers in working 
out a fair settlement with the contractor. The article specifically provides, 
also, that the Contracting Officer shall include in such settlement "such 
allowance for anticipated profit with respect to the uncompleted portion 
of the contract as is reasonable under all the circumstances." 
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The Difficulty of Determining the Cost of the Uncomfleted Portion 
Terminations under the standard termination article- may, in most 
cases, provide some difficult accounting, determinations. Foremost among 
these is the necessity of computing the cost of the uncompleted portion 
of the contract. This, of course, requires a separation of the costs incurred 
under the contract between the completed and uncompleted portions. 
Except in the rare cases where the cost accounting records are of such 
excellence that this information can be secured readily, the separation of 
costs incurred between the completed and uncompleted portions of the 
contract is a difficult task to accomplish. 
In order to segregate the costs of the completed and uncompleted 
portions, it becomes necessary to determine the percentage of completion 
of the contract. It is obvious that costs incurred should not, in all cases, 
be related to the total estimated cost of the contract to determine the 
proper percentage of completion. In other cases, gross inequities to the 
contractor may result if the percentage of completion is determined solely 
on a unit basis. 
With these difficulties present in the vast majority of terminations, a 
basis of settlement which does not involve such complexities should be 
selected for the applicable cases. 
The Total Cost Basis of Settlement 
By virtue of the fact that the termination article provides for a nego­
tiated settlement, it is possible to avoid the rigid formula settlement with 
its difficulties of cost separation. Inasmuch as the Contracting Officer has 
the right to determine the amount of the settlement due to the contractor 
on the basis of negotiation with him, he may select some other suitable 
basis of cost determination. 
As a guide to the Contracting Officer in effecting a negotiated settle­
ment, there has been evolved in the Wa r Department the total cost basis 
of settlement. In its essence this basis comprises the following: 
a. Determination of the total cost of the contract to the date of termination 
(excluding claims of subcontractors and vendors and the estimated cost of settling 
commitments of the contractor, which are dealt with, separately). 
b. To this should be added an amount for profit. The Contracting Officer, 
taking into consideration all of the evidence which would indicate what profit, 
if any, would have been earned had the contract been completed, negotiates a 
fair rate of profit in the settlement. Before applying the negotiated rate of 
profit to the total contract costs, there should be excluded therefrom such items 
as the cost of standard raw materials in the inventory totally unprocessed at the 
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date of termination and similar items which represent work not warranting a 
profit allowance thereon. 
c. From the sum of the total costs and the profit determined by use of 
the negotiated rate, the amount of the payments already made and to be made 
is deducted. The balance is the indicated equitable claim for the uncompleted 
portion of the contract before deductions for salvage and excluding vendors' 
and subcontractors' claims. 
The amount of the negotiated settlement, exclusive of costs incurred 
after termination, when added to the payments previously made or to be 
made is limited by the total amount of the contract. 
The Negotiated Rate of Profit 
With the Contracting Officer possessing the right to negotiate a 
settlement, it is thought desirable for him also to negotiate the rate of 
profit. The profit which would have been earned under the contract 
had it been completed, might, in some cases, be so high as to result in 
renegotiation proceedings. It seems futile, therefore, to use such a rate 
and, as a result, consummate a settlement which would seem inevitably 
to lead to a refund through such renegotiation. It would be wiser, there­
fore, for the Contracting Officer to negotiate a rate which is lower than 
the indicated rate and low enough to avoid later refund. 
When the contractor has more than one contract, the Contracting 
Officer should determine whether losses on other contracts may offset a 
large profit on the terminated contract. Renegotiation would not be so 
likely to occur in this latter case, and it may be undesirable to negotiate 
a rate which is appreciably lower than the indicated rate. 
The negotiated rate cannot be higher than the indicated rate but may 
be lower as the circumstances may require, especially where, as was sug­
gested before, later renegotiation proceedings might require a refund. 
Comfutation of Indicated Equitable Claims for, the UncoTnfleted Portion 
of Contract 
T o illustrate the application of the procedures outlined in the fore­
going, the computation of the indicated equitable claim for the uncompleted 
portion of the contract follows: 
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ILLUSTRATIO N A 
Total contract costs incurred (excluding claims of subcontractors) $1,000,000 
Negotiated rate of profit—8% 80,000 
Total $1,080,000 
Deduct: 
Payments already made for completed and 
delivered units $600,000 
•Payments to be made for completed units 
not delivered 58,000 
Total payments made and to be made 658,000 
Indicated equitable claim for uncompleted portion of the contract 
before deductions for salvage and excluding vendors' 
and subcontractors' claims $ 422,000 
NOTE: In the above example, it has been assumed that the Contracting Officer does not feel 
that it is necessary to exclude from the cost base to which the agreed percentage of 
profit is applied any items of cost on the ground that they do not represent sub­
stantial work for the contractor. If the contract costs include any allowance for 
special obsolescence, a deduction should be made from the cost base for the purpose 
of computing the allowance for profit. 
Losses Sustained 
A contract may be terminated at a juncture at which it is clearly 
indicated that a loss would have been sustained if the contract had been 
completed. It is not the intention to "bail out" the contractor for the 
losses sustained on the completed portion of the contract. However, 
inasmuch as Procurement Regulations 324 provide that the contractor 
should receive reimbursement for 100 per cent of his costs for the uncom­
pleted portion of the contract, no part of an indicated loss may properly 
be assigned to the uncompleted portion. 
The computation of the indicated equitable claim for the uncompleted 
portion of the contract where a loss is estimated to have taken place on 
the completed portion is illustrated below. The total of the payments 
made on the contract, and those to be made, for completed units should 
be converted to the indicated cost of the completed units represented by 
these payments by application of the indicated percentage of loss. This 
converted cost will then be deducted from the total contract costs to date 
of termination to ascertain the indicated claim for the uncompleted portion 
before deductions for salvage and excluding vendors' and subcontractors* 
claims. This may be illustrated as follows: 
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ILLUSTRATIO N B 
Assume an indicated loss of 6 per cent on the cost of the entire contract: 
Payments made and to be made for completed portion $658,000= 9 4  % 
Indicated cost of completed portion (A) 700,000=100 % 
Total contract costs incurred to date of termination $1,000,000 
Indicated cost of completed portion (A) 700,000 
Indicated equitable claim for uncompleted portion before 
deduction for salvage and excluding vendors' and 
subcontractors' claims $ 300,000 
Total payments to the contractor plus the indicated amount 
of the claim would then be: 
Payments made and to be made for completed portion $ 658,000 
Indicated equitable claim for uncompleted portion 300,000 
Total payments and claims $ 958,000 
Proof 
Total contract costs to date of termination $1,000,000 
Less: Indicated loss applicable to the completed portion, 
•6% of $700,000 42,000 
Indicated payments (as above) $ 958,000* 
* Before salvage deductions and excluding claims of subcontractors and vendors. 
It will be noticed in this illustration that no loss was computed for 
the uncompleted portion. This is in line with the provisions of Procurement 
Regulations 324 cited above. 
It should be pointed out in passing, that it is not always easy to deter­
mine whether or not a loss would be indicated if the contract were to be 
completed. There may be high non-recurring preparatory expenses and 
other "starting load" costs. It may be that these costs should be spread 
over the entire contract for the purpose of determining the profitableness, 
or otherwise, of the completed portion. Employee training and the adapting 
of even skilled employees to a new product may result in higher costs in 
the early stages. In other cases, the "break-even point" may not be reached 
until a large part of the contract is completed, and the profit earned may 
be realized, if at all, late in the life of the contract. In still other cases, 
it may be difficult to determine that the contractor would ever reach the 
break-even point by the end of the contract. 
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As a general rule, however, indicated losses on the completed portion 
will be treated as set forth in the foregoing illustration. 
The Manual for Administrative Audit of Termination Claims of Fixed-
Price Suffly Contractors 
There is being prepared in the Fiscal Division, Headquarters, A.S.F., 
a manual for the administrative audit of termination claims of fixed-price 
supply contractors. During the past four months, much time and effort 
have been put on the preparation of this manual. Out of this effort certain 
definite ideas and concepts have emerged. Among them has been the 
total-contract-cost theory of determining the base for the computation of 
the indicated equitable claim for the uncompleted portion of the contract. 
The negotiated rate concept came from the same source. 
The termination audit manual, when completed and finally approved 
for publication, will be designed to assist the Contracting Officer and the 
accounting staff aiding him in dealing with termination problems of fixed-
price supply contracts where settlements are on a negotiated .basis. The 
reports produced as a result of following the accounting and auditing 
procedures in the manual are intended to be advisory only and to serve 
as a guide to the Contracting Officer. His is the final authority and the 
complete responsibility for negotiating a settlement with a contractor. 
However, it is obvious that he will need a great deal of auditing assistance, 
as many detailed complicated accounting problems will arise in the settle­
ment of termination claims. 
Th e War Department auditors, on the other hand, may have been 
spending a large part of their time and energy auditing cost-plus-a-fixed-fee 
contracts. Suddenly, they may be confronted with the necessity of meeting 
the exigencies of fixed-price termination claims and their proper and 
equitable settlement. If these auditors are to be able to assist the Contract­
ing Officer in securing the proper information to effect settlement of these 
termination claims, they must be furnished with guides and a set of audit 
procedures and techniques suitable for the purpose and based upon a sound 
underlying philosophy. 
Th e proposed manual is being prepared to meet these needs. In its 
present form it has progressed far enough toward meeting these objectives 
that the Ordnance Department has adopted it and made it a part of 
Ordnance Procurement Instructions. In this form and under these auspices, 
the manual will be given a test as to adequacy and sufficiency in the settle­
ment of a great many current termination claims. With such a laboratory 
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and out of such experience, it is hoped, will be gained the information and 
knowledge necessary to meet the gigantic auditing program which will 
be created on "V " Day. Thus, the long view is being taken, and, while 
there is yet time, ample thought is being given to many troublesome con­
siderations which are sure to arise en masse later. It is the hope and the 
present plans that when "V " Day arrives the service auditors will be 
aware of the accounting problems incident to fixed-price terminations and 
thoroughly conversant with the procedures necessary to effect equitable 
settlements. This, then, is an objective which is to be met through the 
Termination Audit Manual. 
Contents of the Manual 
The manual, after describing the basis of settlement on a negotiated 
basis (most of which has been touched upon here), gives some space to 
the contractor's claim, in which the contractor will be given certain infor­
mation and guides for the preparation of the claim. One of the most 
significant chapters in the manual is the one which deals with the deter­
mination of allowable costs. This cost definition will be highly necessary 
in any determination of total costs under the contract and should be 
helpful to the Contracting Officer and contractor alike in the negotiation 
proceedings. 
Certain of the contractor's procedures, such as the taking of the 
physical inventory at termination, the determination of salvage values, 
and the treatment and handling of subcontractors' and vendors' claims, 
are given careful consideration and development. 
The last half of the manual is devoted to a discussion of the appli­
cable auditing procedures to develop a program for the specific case under 
discussion—fixed-price termination claims subject to negotiation through 
the use of the total contract-cost basis of settlement and through the use 
of the negotiated rate. 
Determination of Allowable Costs 
Before negotiation can properly take place, and before a determination 
of total contract costs can be made, some agreement must be had con­
cerning certain items of cost. While T.D . 5000 was adopted in the 
preponderance of cost-plus-a-iixed-fee supply contracts, its use is restricted 
to that type of contract, and it does not apply to the determination of cost 
in connection with fixed-price contracts. Chapter 5 of the proposed manual 
sets forth the basis for the determination of allowable costs. It is significant 
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that, while the information is presented in this chapter as a guide, the 
point is nevertheless made that the determination of allowable costs is 
placed in the hands of the Contracting Officer as required by the Ter­
mination Article. 
The article provides that costs should be allowed which are incident 
to and necessary for the performance of the contract, are reasonable in 
amount and are stated in accordance with recognized accounting practices. 
The unusual items which are included in the determination of allowable 
costs, as outlined in Chapter 5, comprise the following: 
a. A proper proportion of institutional advertising may be allowed. 
b. Experimental and research expenses may be allowed to the extent that 
the Contracting Officer finds that such expenses are applicable to the contract 
in accordance with, recognized accounting practice. 
c. A proper proportion of franchise and excise taxes (including the declared 
value Federal capital stock tax, but not the declared value excess profits tax) may 
be allowed as determined in accordance with recognized accounting practice. 
d. Accounting, legal, clerical and other expenses in connection with the 
discontinuance and termination of the contract and subcontracts thereto, other 
than in connection with litigation of claims against the Government, may be 
allowed. 
e. A provision for costs of designing and producing special tooling (includ­
ing but not limited to costs of special tooling of the type of jigs, dies, fixtures, 
patterns and similar items) may be allowed to the extent that the Contracting 
Officer finds that such costs, in accordance with recognized accounting practices, 
are properly allocable to the contract. 
f. Wartime obsolescence "may be allowed to the extent that the Contract­
ing Officer finds that the facility in question was acquired for the performance 
of the contract, or the contract and other contracts, and the loss in useful value 
has in fact clearly occurred and is properly allocable to the terminated contract 
and provided the contractor agrees to protect and does protect the interest of 
the Government in such cases by transfer of title to the Government, by stand-by 
agreement or any other manner judged to be appropriate by the Contracting 
Officer/' 
In no event shall the aggregate of amounts allowed for special tooling 
and wartime obsolescence "be greater than the contract price payable, if the 
contract had been completed, less the amount of all costs which the Con­
tracting Officer estimates would have been required to perform the contract 
completely, excluding these two special allowances." 
Items excluded as allowable items of cost include: 
a. Losses on other contracts, losses from sales or exchanges of capital assets, 
legal and accounting fees in connection with reorganizations, anti-trust litigation 
and prosecution of Federal income-tax claims or other claims against the Govern­
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ment, losses on investments, provision for contingencies, fines and penalties arising 
from failure to perform Government contracts. 
b. The expense of conversion of the contractor's facilities to uses other 
than performance of the contract. 
c. Expenses found by the Contracting Officer to be due to the negligence 
or willful failure of contractor to discontinue with reasonable promptness the 
incurring of expenses after the effective date of the discontinuance notice. 
d. Costs found by the Contracting Officer to have been incurred in respect 
to facilities, materials or services purchased, or work done in excess of the reason­
able quantitative requirements of the contract after fair allowance for spoilage in 
manufacturing. 
The Need for Contractors to Prefare for Termination through Their 
Accounting Records 
Through the publication of the proposed termination audit manual, 
contractors will be apprised of the nature of the accounting problems arising 
out of the termination of fixed-price supply contracts before completion. 
T o anticipate the probable necessities of such terminations, contractors 
should, in the light of this information, accumulate their accounting data 
accordingly. Speed of reimbursement and equity of settlement will be 
greatly facilitated if the accounting information required for a negotiated 
settlement is easily obtainable. The demands of "V" Day will produce a 
monumental problem with which the War Department auditors must cope. 
The War Department is taking the long view in preparing now for con­
tract terminations at the end of the war. If the contractors match this with 
their readiness in an accounting way, the desire for speedy, equitable and 
orderly settlement of termination claims will become an actuality. 
DISCUSSION 
CHAIRMAN HAWK: I am asked to make this announcement. Any of you 
who might have occasion to leave early will be interested, I am sure, in the 
proceedings of this meeting, which are to be published by the University and 
will be sent gratis to all of those who have registered. So, if you haven't 
registered, please do so upon leaving. There is no charge for registration. 
I am sure all of you have a lot of questions which have occurred to you 
during these interesting remarks by the speakers. The meeting so far has been 
up here on the platform. Now it is yours. So, who has the first question? You 
can direct your question to an individual speaker or let them decide among 
themselves who would like to answer it. In order to facilitate the questions, 
we are going to eliminate the calling out of your name and company. So please 
just stand up and give your questions. 
QUESTION: Mr. Blough, as you were going along I was making notes, and 
if you don't mind my standing until they are disposed of, I would like to do so. 
Concerning the matter of renegotiation, there was a meeting held in 
Pittsburgh. To your knowledge, were the four Boards appointed to handle 
renegotiations present at the meeting? 
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M R  . BLOUGH: Five. 
QUESTION: I was concerned whether there was going to be printed matter 
issued on rulings? 
M R  . BLOUGH: There will be printed matter released, as a result of that 
meeting, to all persons in renegotiation work. So far as I know, it will not go to 
the general public. It was purely a training meeting to draw all those involved 
closer together and to indoctrinate them with the policies of the Boards. 
QUESTION: I just learned this the other day. Out of that discussion in 
Pittsburgh there came this principle. I know it to be a fact that the Navy has 
had contracts out, for, I should say, maybe the last year or two, which provided 
for a 90 per cent payment on the contract upon delivery of the equipment, and 
the remaining 10 per cent was withheld, sometimes as long as a year thereafter, 
probably in some kind of a guaranteed fund, which they retained. Now they 
told me that in view of the fact that the contract provided for those terms—that 
is, 90 per cent down upon the delivery of the equipment and 10 per cent, let's 
say, a year thereafter—and since there was no dispute between the supplier 
of the equipment and the Navy Department, the fact that the entire 100 per cent 
was not paid by April 28, 1942, would throw the entire amount of that particular 
sale or contract into the renegotiable group. 
M R  . BLOUGH: That is right. 
QUESTION: In other words, the principle revolves around this question? 
M R  . BLOUGH: The contract had not been completed and paid for prior 
to April 28. 
QUESTION: The point they made, I think, was that there was no dispute 
between the two parties as to the price or quality of the equipment, or anything 
of that sort. Now in the joint statement that was issued by the Army and the 
Navy and the Maritime Commission and the Treasury Department, under 
March 31, 1943, there is one paragraph, entitled III-J-PAB-I, concerning the 
matter of subcontractors. By way of illustration, they show in that paragraph 
a case wherein 60 per cent of the subcontractor's business was subject to renegoti­
ation, and they suggest from that that only 60 per cent of the material supplied 
to that subcontractor is subject to renegotiation by the prime contractor. Now 
I received a letter from Mr, Rockey just the other day—he happens to be 
chairman of the Navy Department Price Adjustment Board—in which he 
elucidated that principle, and stated that it might be possible, for example, that 
a subcontractor may have had only 10 per cent of volume subject to renegotiation. 
Therefore, the prime contractor who supplies that contract has only 10 per cent 
of his business with that subcontractor subject to renegotiation. 
Now here is what comes out of that application—I will try to illustrate 
it with this example: Let us suppose that a subcontractor did 40 per cent of his 
business prior to April 28, 1942. I mean by that that only 40 per cent was 
delivered and paid for prior to April 28, 1942, that the remaining 60 per cent of 
his business done in the year 1942 was evenly distributed—that is, 30 per cent of 
it (50 per cent of the remaining 60 per cent of business) was subject to renegoti­
ation and the other 30 per cent was not. In other words, in the entire year's 
business, you have this breakdown: You have 40 per cent delivered and paid 
for prior to April 28, 30 per cent is renegotiable, and the other 30 per cent is not 
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renegotiable. Now, in the application of this principle of the proportion of 
renegotiable to non-renegotiable contracts of this subcontractor in the case I cited, 
would 70 per cent be considered as renegotiable or would it be a 50-50 split? 
M R  . BLOUGH: I would like to say that we all regret having put that 60 
per cent illustration into the joint statement, because it is only a last resort, where 
you cannot in any more equitable or clear-cut way determine the end use of your 
product. Under certain circumstances we recognize that when you sell to an 
industry you don't know the end use. What we had in mind there was not the 
sale to an individual contractor, because there you usually ascertain from him the 
proportionate part of the end use of your material that went to the government. 
I should say that, in general, on the assumption that your goods are used just 
as much in the non-renegotiable as in the renegotiable business, the presumption 
would be that you would be subject to renegotiation on that part of your sales 
to that contractor that had not been fully paid for prior to April 28. Regardless 
of what part of the contractor's sales were renegotiable, your renegotiable business 
would be that part of your sales that had not been delivered and fully paid for 
prior to April 28, computed on the basis of the proportion of your material 
that he uses in government as against non-government business. It is only a device 
to be used when we can't find a better way. If he is using your material entirely 
for war work, and is not using it in the jobs that he is doing for his non-
renegotiable business, that percentage would mean nothing so far as you are 
concerned. You would be subject to renegotiation on all your sales to him after 
April 28. If, on the other hand, the material you sold to him was not used 
in government business, you wouldn't be renegotiable on any of it, regardless 
of how much of his was renegotiable. But where you can't get any better basis 
and where your goods are used indiscriminately in his industry as between 
renegotiable and non-renegotiable business, the assumption is that it would be 
fair to divide your sales to him on the basis of the same proportion that his 
renegotiable business bears to his non-renegotiable business. 
QUESTION: I would interpret that to mean that it is a question of re­
negotiable and non-renegotiable after April? 
M R  . BLOUGH: NO , on the aggregate of your business, ending with these 
five government departments, not paid for until after April 28. If you had not 
been paid for it prior to April 28, and it is the type of material that would be 
subject to renegotiation to you, it would be subject to renegotiation even though 
your customer had completed his sale and been paid for it. I wouldn't quite 
know how that would happen, but it might! On the other hand, if he had 
completed his contract with you prior to April 28 by receipt of and payment 
for all the material he used throughout the whole year, you would not be subject 
to renegotiation on such sales even though he was renegotiable on all of the 
business on which he used the materials he got from you. 
QUESTION: NOW my next question is: Do you anticipate any changes 
in the law? 
M R  . BLOUGH: Yes, there are changes in the law that are anticipated. 
The Price Adjustment Boards have recommended two changes: one, that com­
panies having aggregate sales to these five departments of less than $500,000 in 
any fiscal year be exempt from renegotiation in that year; two, that instead of 
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companies being given the opportunity of filing a statement with respect to their 
business with the Price Adjustment Boards in order to start the statute of 
limitations running, they shall be compelled to file. 
QUESTION: DO you know if they contemplate a change to include the 
Defense Plant Corporation business as renegotiable? 
M R  . BLOUGH: Recommendations have been made that the Defense Plant 
Corporation business be included in renegotiation. Committees of Congress have 
recommended that it be included, but neither the War Department nor the 
Navy or any of the other departments have taken any position on it. They 
believe that it is a problem to be settled by the Defense Plant Corporation and 
Congress. 
QUESTION: Has the Defense Plant Corporation attempted to advance that 
idea so as to get into the renegotiation picture? 
M R  . BLOUGH: I cannot say that it has. I, personally, have recommended 
to the Committee of Congress that it be included. It makes no sense to me that 
one who is a manufacturer of a tool, for example, which he sells to a manufacturer 
of a war product, destined for the War Department, is subject to renegotiation 
on that sale, but, if he sells his tool directly to the government in the form of the 
Defense Plant Corporation, the sale is not renegotiable. However, that is the 
way it is. 
QUESTION: Could it be made retroactive? 
M R  . BLOUGH: I can't say. Congress has that power. 
QUESTION: The next question I have is: Is any provision being made for 
handling the problems of the destruction of the future market? By way of 
illustration, I will cite you this example. I represent a number of machine-tool 
builders, and every one of them is very much concerned about the market for 
machine tools after this war is over. The president of one company made the 
statement to me that he couldn't see any machine-tool business for a period of five 
years after the cessation of hostilities. That would be a serious thing for the 
machine-tool business. 
M R  . BLOUGH: I suppose you are thoroughly familiar with the article 
in the May ioth issue of Timel 
QUESTION: I didn't see the May ioth issue of Timey but I did see a very 
enlightening article in the Wall Street Journal. 
M R  . BLOUGH: The article in Time quotes one good machine-tool manu­
facturer who doesn't"subscribe to the view you just mentioned. 
Let's consider the machine-tool industry, in which you are principally 
interested. In certain phases of machine-tool manufacture there Is no question 
in my mind but that the manufacturer is glutting the market for himself in the 
future; for example, a machine-tool builder who is manufacturing a type of 
machine-tool which is adaptable to all kinds of machining business, and which 
is not of a special-purpose nature, will suffer after the war because he and his 
competitors have produced from 4 to 10 times as many machines in 1940, 1941? 
and 1942 as they did during their base period, we will say from 1936 to I939> 
inclusive. They have probably turned out more machines than industry would 
have ordered in a longer period of time had it not been for the war. Assuming 
that those machines are not used up in the production of war business, which 
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may be reasonably presumed inasmuch as they are machines that have a normal 
life of 10 to 15 years, they will be available for sale to those who want them 
after the war, who would otherwise buy new ones. It is clear to everybody 
that there will be a period of time beginning soon when that type of machine-tool 
manufacturer is likely to have a considerable lull in his market. 
On the other hand, there are other machine-tool manufacturers who will 
not be faced with that problem. They are manufacturing machine-tools of special 
type for war purposes, and their increased production during the war will have 
no effect whatsoever on their peacetime production. There are other cases 
in between. 
The Price Adjustment Boards are attempting to study the situation in these 
various machine-tool fields. The machine-tool builders have argued as though 
every machine-tool manufacturer were in the same situation and that all were 
in bad shape. We are trying to distinguish among them. We recognize that 
some have a problem, but we know some do not have it to such a great degree, 
and some do not have it at all. 
We are trying to take this factor into consideration in determining the 
fairness of the profit that should be allowed in the individual case. Where the 
problem exists to an acute extent, there is no question but that such a company 
is entitled to higher profits than a company which is not faced with it. However, 
we do not consider such a situation to be a reason why a company should be 
allowed to make highly excessive profits. 
Let us consider this example: Assume that a machine-tool manufacturer 
has been making a margin of from 15 to 20 per cent during the normal period 
in the industry, I should say its peak period, because 1936 to 1939 was, in the 
machine-tool industry, virtually a peak period. Now, in the war period it has 
six or seven times its 193 6-193 9 volume of business, and is earning a margin 
of from 35 to 40 per cent. It is clear to us that companies in that situation, 
even if they do have to close up for three or four years after the war, will have 
made considerably more profit than they are entitled to on the basis of what 
they would ordinarily be turning out under peacetime conditions. 
I think that, in all due justice to the rest of the gentlemen herey I may 
have spent more time on a particular field than I should have, although I , 
recognize that this problem in the machine-tool industry is applicable in 
certain other industries. The machine-tool business is not alone in having 
that particular problem. 
QUESTION: Mr. Chairman, these recent publications mention over-all 
settlement of cancellation costs similar to the over-all renegotiation of contracts. 
I wonder if any of the speakers would comment on that point. 
MAJOR TAYLOR: YOU mean on the question of all contracts being 
settled at one time? 
QUESTION: The question of all contracts of a particular company, so 
that its claims would not be disputed in the future, knowing there was going 
to be the over-all settlement to follow. 
MAJOR TAYLOR: It is obvious that a contracting officer is not going to 
take the contracts piecemeal, if they are all being terminated at one time. 
Provision certainly is made for dealing with a contractor on all the contracts 
he has with one agency of the United States Government. 
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Cooperation is being worked out between the Army and Navy so that 
it may be possible to settle with the contractor for all terminated contracts. 
You realize, of course, that the experiences gained in the current terminations, 
and there are far more terminations than most people realize, will help us 
at the other end of the road. I certainly anticipate that we will have an 
over-all settlement with the contractor on a negotiated basis. Does that answer 
your question? 
QUESTION: I understood from your discussion that, in the negotiated 
settlement of a claim, when you had arrived at a negotiated rate of profit, 
the profit is to be calculated on the total costs involved in that contract to the 
date of cancellation. 
MAJOR TAYLOR: That is right. 
QUESTION: I got the impression from Mr. Olive that the general public 
had the feeling that perhaps that rate of profit would be on the entire amount 
of the contract rather than on the processed and completed portion, and I 
wanted to have that point brought out. 
MAJOR TAYLOR: The profit would not be computed. on the entire 
amount of the contract. We would, if we could, determine the cost of the 
uncompleted portion of the contract and apply the rate of profit thereto, 
thereby complying specifically with the contract termination article, which 
says that the contractor shall be paid the cost of his uncompleted portion plus 
a profit. 
QUESTION: Major, there is one other question. The procedure recently 
released indicates that the same principles will apply in the sub-contractor's 
claims as will in the prime contractor's claims. The contractor's contract 
has a very definite and specific cancellation provision. The sub-contractor in 
many cases has a purchase order, or has no cancellation article, and under such 
a cancellation the subcontractor has certain rights under common law. Under 
common law, I believe a subcontractor has a right to sue and recover 100 per 
cent of the profit he might have realized, eliminating speculation. Under 
those circumstances, can the standard procedure used in the case of the prime 
contractor apply to the sub? 
MAJOR TAYLOR: That is going to be a troublesome problem. It is 
being recognized by the attorneys in the War Department, and I expect that 
they will arrive at some satisfactory answer. 
QUESTION: My question is in regard to construction-materials negoti­
ation. In determining the amount of non-negotiable sales, you mentioned 
that you included the sales to public utilities and railroads. Do you also 
include sales to private corporations, such as ship-building yards, ammunition 
factories, airfield buildings, and others in the same category, or do you include 
those as indirect government? 
M R  . BLOUGH: Yes, when you sell to a shipyard—now let's get a 
distinction here—if you sell to a shipyard anything which enters into the 
vessel. 
QUESTION: It does not enter into the vessel. I am talking about plant-
construction materials and yard construction. 
M R  . BLOUGH: YOU contract something which becomes a part of real 
estate? 
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QUESTION: Yes. 
M R  . BLOUGH: And it is not paid for ultimately by the government— 
it is paid for by the shipyard, a separate corporation? 
QUESTION: Yes. 
M R  . BLOUGH: It is not subject to renegotiation. 
QUESTION: May I ask, Mr. Blough, am I correct in assuming that 
Price Adjustment Boards take cognizance of a condition where a contractor 
has many contracts, some of which involve labor and material and others 
involve only labor? Do they take cognizance of the fact that a contractor 
has a higher percentage of profit on his contracts involving only labor than 
those involving labor and materials? 
M R  . BLOUGH: That is right. 
QUESTION: HOW may that be best presented in the presentation of the 
contractor's reports? 
M R  . BLOUGH: One of the best things for a contractor to do in order 
to bring out a situation of that kind is to show, if it is possible for him to do 
it without unreasonable effort: first, the amount of parts and assemblies which 
he buys from others; second, the amount of raw material which he buys and 
processes; third, the amount of his labor; and fourth, the amount of his 
overhead. In this way, his costs are broken down into those four categories, 
and if he has certain commodities on which he has a different proportion than 
on others, then it will be well to separate those, if he can, so that different 
consideration may be given to the product that is in the one category than 
to the product in the other category. 
QUESTION: For instance, if you have $10 million worth of renegotiable 
contracts and $3 million of them involve labor only—the material having been 
supplied by a government agency—just a statement to that effect is about 
all you can do? 
MR . BLOUGH: I see what you mean. Yes, when the prime contractor 
is furnishing you materials upon which you work and charge him for your 
services, or when you take a contract to do a particular job for him, or you 
receive materials from the government and you process them and turn them 
back. Is that what you have in mind? Yes, a simple statement with respect to 
that should be made. 
In talking about ratios and the extent to which you are entitled to profit 
on a project of that kind, I should like to point out that if you included the 
full value of all of the materials and the labor as part of your costs, but did 
not furnish the materials or take any risks on the materials, you would not be 
entitled to as high a profit as would the person who furnishes both the materials 
and the labor. On the other hand, if you are relating it, as you likely would, 
just to the labor element without including any costs for materials you would 
be entitled to a higher ratio of profit, other things being equal, than the 
company that furnished both the materials and labor and had them both in 
its costs. That is one reason we can't develop any kind of a formula which 
will £.t varying cases. It is why I said a bit ago that it is a matter of judgment. 
QUESTION: Mr. Blough, could consideration be given to individual 
losses? In one case we might have a policy adjustment- where future services 
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are required which, are not provided for, and another case where curtailment 
in schedule is forced upon a company. 
M R  . BLOUGH: Those are difficult questions. So far as actually allowing 
any charge for those things as a part of the cost, it may not be done. In the 
first place, our accounting is pretty largely confined to the acceptance of the 
type of allowances and deductions that are allowed for income tax purposes 
and the proportions that are allocable to the renegotiable business. Now the 
kind of thing you are talking about isn't allowable for income tax purposes. 
One reason why it isn't is because it isn't possible to determine it with reason­
able accuracy at the time. 
QUESTION: Would the principle of carry-back be applicable in the future? 
M R  . BLOUGH: Carry-back future losses against profits? No. But what I 
was going to say was that, while we cannot allow a fixed amount as a specific 
deduction, where a contractor has that element present, it is an element of risk 
in his business which is greater than that of the company that does not have 
it present, and one of the factors that must be rewarded by profits are risks that 
are being taken. So, if a reasonable showing of the existence of that kind of a 
risk is made, it will be given consideration in the rate of profit allowed, though 
it is not allowed as a specific deduction in arriving at profit. 
QUESTION: I have a question for Mr. Blough. If the subcontract provides 
for renegotiation, does the general renegotiation for subcontract by the govern­
ment eliminate the necessity of the subcontractor continuing these renegotiations 
with the prime contractor? 
M R  . BLOUGH: I can't answer that question in the absence of the specific 
contract you have. If this contract which you mention between the subcontractor 
and the prime contractor contains the renegotiation clause that is placed there 
at the request of the Secretary of War or the Secretary of the Navy, that clause 
does not call for renegotiation between the subcontractor and the prime contractor. 
This clause calls for renegotiation, but it is the renegotiation that will take place 
between the subcontractor and the government and does not contemplate a 
renegotiation between the prime contractor and the subcontractor. Now if you 
have some other clause which you inserted in order to give your prime contractor 
the benefit of any savings that you may make, that is outside the field entirely, and 
while it might complicate the issue when you came to the renegotiation with the 
government, it would basically have nothing to do with the renegotiation between 
the government and the subcontractor, nor would our renegotiation have anything 
to do with the relationship between the prime contractor and the subcontractor. 
They would be independent of each other. Presumably, the one would have to 
be completed before the other one could be completed. I should think you would 
get into considerable difficulty if you had that kind of a contract, but so far I 
have not run into many of that kind. Most of them are the standard type of 
renegotiation clause which is required by the War and Navy Departments. 
QUESTION: What effect will the depreciation of inventory prices have on 
the termination of the contract? Will the prices be as of the date of the 
termination, or will depreciation be given consideration? 
MAJOR TAYLOR: Of course, you are talking factual matters now, which 
are more or less up to the determination of the contracting officer. He has utmost 
freedom in determining the values of the inventory, what salvage there is. 
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QUESTION: Wouldn't the market have an effect? 
MAJOR TAYLOR: That is for the contracting officer to decide. I can't 
answer that question. It is a factual matter. It is something for him to decide 
when he gets down to the individual case, and he can decide as he pleases in a 
negotiated settlement. Of course, you realize the contractor doesn't have to 
accept the settlement he offers. 
• QUESTION: I wonder, Mr. Blough, if you have determined and established 
a definition of real estate? In examining different state laws, we run into a lot 
of different interpretations of what is included in real estate. Since that has 
such a large bearing on the segregation of renegotiable and non-renegotiable sales, 
I wonder if you could establish a policy on that? 
M R  . BLOUGH: NO, we have never attempted to define real estate. There 
are differences in the .state laws, it is true. I think we have, generally, gone on 
the assumption that it is land, buildings, other things attached to the land, or 
equipment, machinery and so forth, which, when installed in the building, could 
not be taken out without defacement or destruction of the building. Otherwise, 
it is considered to be personal property. That is a rather rough determination, 
but it is the one which, generally, is used. 
QUESTION: Mr. Blough, what is the penalty for the unwillingness of a 
contractor to cooperate in a renegotiation? 
M R  . BLOUGH: I tried to explain that in my original talk. So far as penalty 
is concerned, there is no penalty that I know of. Ultimately, the matter will get 
up to the Under Secretary of War, or the Under Secretary of the Navy, or to the 
Chairman of the Maritime Commission, or the head of the department that has 
charge of the renegotiation. I assume everybody here understands that the 
department that is assigned the job of renegotiating is the department that has 
the bulk of the business with the company, and that it renegotiates for all 
departments and gives clearance for all departments. 
Now the head of the department that has been assigned the job of conduct­
ing the renegotiation will ultimately get the case and make a finding. He is 
charged under the statute to make a finding as to whether or not there are 
excessive profits. If he finds there are, he is required to make that finding. 
He would then proceed to work out some satisfactory plan of recovery or with­
holding. The matter may never go that far. 
I happen to know of a particular situation. This is not common practice, 
but it is certainly within the power of the contracting officer. A "particular 
company has not been able to reach an agreement with the Price Adjustment 
Board. The contracting officer who has been letting the contracts to that company 
is now faced with the problem of letting a new contract. Their old contracts 
are practically finished. He told the company last week, "Your machines belong 
to us. You are in this business by virtue of the War Department. Now you make 
up your mind whether you want to stay in this business or not." 
QUESTION: Assuming that the findings of renegotiation proceedings finally 
got up to the Under Secretary, is there anything in the set-up that would permit 
some government agency, perhaps the controller general's office, to reopen a case 
two or three years from now? 
M R  . BLOUGH: The statute specifically provides that the renegotiation is 
final. I don't know just how final. I think that in case there should be a 
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unilateral determination, a subsequent renegotiation agreement would close it 
also, although I am not sure about that. I do know that, if you enter into an 
agreement which is signed by the Under Secretary, the statute specifically closes 
the door to any reopening from the standpoint of determination of excessive 
profits. 
CHAIRMAN HAWK: We have a gentleman here this morning who holds an 
important committee post in the American Institute of Accountants. I would like 
to call on Victor Stempf, who is Chairman of the Committee on Profit Limitations 
of the American Institute, to say something on this. 
M R  . VICTOR STEMPF: I hesitated to take the floor for fear of prolonging 
the proceedings. Nevertheless, I think that we ought to bring into the open the 
fact that there still remains in industry a mute but none-the-less cynical distrust 
and indignation concerning the administration of renegotiations. Frankly, I, 
personally, am still not wholly convinced that that view is not to some degree 
justified. I have in mind three or four points. First, the continued reference 
to these rare and rather scandalous cases which, to the man on the street, impugn 
the integrity, good faith, and perhaps patriotism of industry generally, which 
all of us in the room know, of course, to be utterly untrue. Secondly, in industry, 
I think the belief is quite prevalent that the continued emphasis upon the positive 
and negative factors of contribution to the war effort are very largely eye-wash. 
The Truman Committee Report indicates that of the average of cases there is 
perhaps a maximum leeway of 2 per cent between the most liberal treatment 
and the most unliberal treatment of cases, and that to me seems to be a definitely 
inadequate margin to measure the difference between a company which makes 
a real contribution to the war effort and one which is utterly inefficient. 
I think that the success or failure of renegotiation depends upon the com­
plete frankness of disclosure of the operation of the Price Adjustment Boards, 
that they must stimulate cooperation, willing cooperation on the part of industry, 
and that they can best do so by finding some means of publishing, by industry, 
and by anonymous cases within industries, the relationship of the profits to 
readjusted sales, which will dispel what, I hope, is a misapprehension as to the 
narrow margin allowed the good company and the bad company. 
I think that in respect of the proposed amendments, it would be far more 
equitable to provide an exclusion to all companies subject to renegotiation of the 
first $500,000, rather than to make it $500,000 as an arbitrary starting point. 
If the company that is doing $499,000 of contracts is to be excluded from 
renegotiation, it seems to be equally fair that the company that is doing 
$10,000,000 of such business should have the first $500,000 excluded. 
I think that the casting aside of provisions for post-war reconversion, 
on the meager plea that they are so indeterminate "as to make consideration of 
them impossible, is just as fantastic as the old story of the ostrich sticking its head 
in the sand. It seems to me we must find some way of measuring these post-war 
reconversion costs, and that they should be allowed. If it can't be done otherwise, 
it must be done by funded reserves, which will be subject to readjustment after 
the war is over. Your carry-back and carry-forward provisions of the Tax Law 
do not serve the purpose adequately, and I think that the future economy, the 
future stability of our business, depends very largely upon the provisions which 
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are now made regarding these post-war reconversion costs. They can't be brushed 
aside as lightly as they have been, both tax-wise and from the standpoint of 
reconversion. 
CHAIRMAN HAWK: Thank you very much, Mr. Sternpf. I take it that 
your remarks are more or less a resume of the recommendations of your commit­
tee, and I rather believe that Mr. Blough would like, perhaps, to have a rebuttal. 
M R  . BLOUGH: In the first place, I should like to say that I think Mr. 
Stempf has misinterpreted somewhat the Truman Committee's statement with 
respect to the Navy Department. In the second place, I think the Truman 
Committee drew too broad a conclusion on the basis of a relatively small number 
of cases which it examined. I agree with you that, if there were any such thing 
as a margin of difference between the good and the bad producer of anywhere 
close to z per cent, it would be wholly inadequate as a measure of a good job 
versus a bad- job. If a poor producer were granted 9 per cent, would a very 
good producer be adequately compensated by 11 per cent? I wouldn't argue 
on that for a minute^ and neither would the Price Adjustment Board. 
With respect to this reconversion reserve, I do not disagree much with 
what Mr. Stempf has said, but I have been wholly at a loss to know how to 
suggest going about an equitable way of allowing provision for it. In the first 
place, if the Price Adjustment Boards make an allowance for post-war reconver­
sion expense in renegotiation, they will have to make an allowance of 4 to 5 times 
as much as the company has to have if it is going to get anything out of it 
tax-wise, because it is not allowed for tax purposes. 
In the second place, I think that the measurability of the amount of a 
post-war requirement is a lot less simple than Mr. Stempf has indicated. H e may 
not have intended to give that impression. There are a lot of companies that 
have gone through rather extensive conversions to the war effort, and they can 
show their conversion costs, which, incidentally, have all been paid for and 
charged against government contracts. These costs have been allowed in 
renegotiation and as tax deductions, and the companies will never reconvert after 
the war. They have now converted their plants to modern businesses, whereas, 
before, they had obsolete plants, and they have done it at the government expense. 
The measure of their post-war reconversion losses is not related whatsoever to the 
amount of their conversion cost in the first place. 
THere are some companies that undoubtedly are going to have great recon­
version expenses after the war, but so are there a lot of companies going to have a 
lot of reconversion expense who didn't do any war business. Industry has pro­
gressed during the period of the war, and after the war is over, whether a man 
was in government business or whether he wasn't, and particularly if his business 
was shut up during the war, he is going to have tremendous post-war reconversion 
expenses. 
T o me, it is a question as to whether or not the company that was fortunate 
enough to have war contracts should expect the government to pay its expenses 
of reconversion to some other type of business after the war, which they would 
have had to go through with anyway, while their competitors who didn't succeed 
in getting war contracts are going to suffer anyway. I think there are two sides 
to the question, and I don't want anybody to go out of here thinking that I am 
102 ACCOUNTING INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS 
not in favor of doing something about providing for those companies that 
definitely have a post-war reconversion problem because they took war contracts, 
for I think they should be provided for. But those companies that would have 
had that problem anyway, and those companies that won't have it because they 
have been able to modernize and develop a fine working plant on war business 
for normal business after the war, should certainly not be allowed anything for 
reconversion as a charge on war contracts. 
There is one other point I want to mention—the $500,000 exemption. I 
have no very strong feeling about that, and I am frank to say that I think 
there is a lot of merit in the suggestion that the whole $500,000 be exempt. 
The Departments were interested in this proposal as a means of reducing the 
administrative burden. There are a tremendous number of small companies, 
companies ranging from $100,000 to $500,000 of business, that, even though 
they make rather high profits over-all, aren't going to stack up to too great 
an amount, particularly after income taxes, and the Departments felt that, while 
undoubtedly there would be some companies having between $100,000 and 
$500,000 of business that would make excessive and possibly exorbitant and/or 
unconscionable profits, still the administrative job was such that it would be 
desirable to limit renegotiation by eliminating concerns whose war business 
was less than $500,000 instead of $100,000. 
Now the policy was fixed when the $100,000 was exempted. The first 
$100,000 of renegotiable business was not exempted—it was just companies with 
less than $100,000—and so the $500,000 exemption was applied in the same 
way. I shouldn't want to argue the equity of the case. I think that there may 
be some merit in the proposal to exempt the first $500,000. On the other hand, 
I think that a lot of the companies with several million dollars of business would 
a lot rather put in the whole thing than to go through the determination as to 
whether the first $500,000 which should be exempted should be that part of 
their business on which they made 7 per cent, or that part on which they made 
32 per cent. This determination has some point when you are trying to decide 
which $500,000 you are going to exempt in a company that has renegotiable 
business. 
M R  . STEMPF: It seems to me, Mr. Blough, that on the $500,000 exemp­
tion, and particularly where it provides over-all renegotiation, there would be no 
question as to the 7 per cent or 32 per cent portion of business that would be 
excluded, because it is largely treated as a unit. 
On the point of the four or five times the allowance that would have to 
be made in renegotiation to give corporations any benefit for allowance for post­
war reconversion, obviously there first must be an amendment of the Internal 
Revenue Code. I think that, as a matter of policy, the Renegotiation Board 
could recognize such provisions, and I think that for the protection and reassur­
ance of industry it would be far better to specifically make provision for their 
recognition in the Renegotiation Act itself. 
The Truman Committee gave the proper reply to your arguments concern­
ing those businesses that did and did not have war business; it said something to 
the effect that recognizing that certain businesses may have been put out of 
business during this war period, it doesn't help either the country or industry 
to also put out of business those companies that did do war business. 
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 think that you are absolutely right that there is a difference in the 
amount of post-war reconversion needed by varying industries. I think, for 
example, that in textile and rubber industries there will not be nearly the post-war 
reconversion costs there will be in the automotive plants in getting back to 
production of pleasure cars and trucks, and I believe that in each industry there 
is a possibility of arriving at engineering estimates of what those costs are going 
to be. I think that if the problem were approached from the standpoint of 
funded reserves, on the basis of scientific estimates of what would be required 
for reconversion purposes, with the provision that that part of the reserve which 
is not used for post-war reconversion shall revert to the Treasury, it would afford 
a relatively simple principle of solution to that problem. 
M R  . BLOUGH: I should like to say that I think Price Adjustment Boards, 
without any question, would follow the Income Tax Law if the Income Tax Law 
made a provision for post-war reconversion reserves. As a matter of fact, I am 
not sure but that they would be required to go along with it under the existing 
law. Furthermore, that would also provide the machinery for policing something 
that will take place later on, which is a responsibility that the Price Adjustment 
Boards have not wanted. This is at least one governmental organization that 
doesn't want to self-perpetuate itself. Every man that I know of in this 
renegotiation job is just hoping that the time will come very soon when he can 
go back to what he was doing before, and the idea of making this a part of 
our regular government by developing a machinery for policing something for 
years after the war is repugnant to those who are in it. But if in the Income 
Tax Law there were some method worked out whereby it could be handled and 
policed in the future, nobody in renegotiation would object to it. 
QUESTION: The Major indicated, and the procedure indicates, that the 
subcontract is the prime responsibility of the prime contractor. Mr. Graham 
has a motto: Where are you to get the auditors? There is an article in Business 
Week, dated May 15, which came out after the release of that treatise on 
procedure, which brings out that the War Department is considering accepting 
direct claims from subcontractors, sub-subcontractors, and so on down the line, 
and cutting the red tape of going through the prime contractors. This is later 
than the treatise that you referred to, and yet it is entirely contradictory, and I 
was interested in knowing if there is some consideration being given to following 
the other line rather than this? 
MAJOR TAYLOR: The prime contractor has the responsibility of making 
sure that the claim to the subcontractor is right. H e cannot avoid it. There 
would be difficulty in dealing with the subcontractor direct, especially wherf* 
there might be some question of the over-all contractual limit. 
CHAIRMAN HAWK: I think that, in view of the lateness of the hour and in 
fairness to the speakers and those who have prior commitments, we should 
conclude this meeting. In conclusion, I want to express appreciation to the 
speakers for the papers that they have presented, and for their courtesy in answer­
ing all these sundry and many questions. It has been a very interesting meeting, 
and I hope you have all enjoyed it as much as I have. 
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LOHNES, G. R., The National Cash Register Co., Dayton, Ohio 
LUNDQUIST, T  . L, Balcrank Incorporated, Cincinnati, Ohio 
LUTZ, R. H., Columbus Coated Fabric Corporation, Columbus, Ohio 
MAIN, GEORGE G., Westinghouse Electric & Manufacturing Co., Pittsburgh, Pa. 
MARTZ, W". R., Wright Aeronautical Corporation, Cincinnati, Ohio 
MASON, ROGER, Kroger Packing Company, Columbus, Ohio 
MCCLEERY, R. B., International-Stacey Corporation, Columbus, Ohio 
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OSTEO, GLE N F., JR .  , Diamond Milk Products Co., Columbus, Ohio 
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PARKER, R. A., Allen R. Smart & Company, Dayton, Ohio 
PATERSON, A. B., Eaton Manufacturing Company, Cleveland, Ohio 
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ROBB, JOHN H., Keller, Kirschner, Martin & Clinger, Columbus, Ohio 
ROBINSON, HOWARD F., The American Art Works Incorporated, Coshocton, Ohio 
ROHLFING, PAUL G., Wall, Cassel & Groneweg, Dayton, Ohio 
ROWE, H . D., Kroger Grocery & Baking Company, Columbus, Ohio 
RUDY, R. S., Summer & Company, Columbus, Ohio 
RUGGLES, J. W., Inland Mfg. Div., G.M.C., Dayton, Ohio 
RUTHERFORD, J. M., Ohio Fuel Gas Company, Columbus, Ohio 
SAUERHAMMER, E. C  , Navy Department, Cost Inspection Division, Curtiss-
Wright Corp., Columbus, Ohio 
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SCHWARTZ, PERRY D., Negotiator, U. S. Engineers, War Department, Columbus, 
Ohio 
SELLERS, GEORGE C  , Ernest & Ernst, Columbus, Ohio 
SHIELDS, M . E., Lloyd & Shields, Dayton, Ohio 
SHIRLEY, JOHN, Arnold, Hawk & Cuthbertson, Dayton, Ohio 
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ULLRICH, WILLIAM A., Dayton, Ohio 
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